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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to dev�lop a methodology for the selection of a paradigm of
reasoning under uncertainty for the expert system developer. This is important since
practical information on how to select a paradigm of reasoning under uncertainty is
not generally available.
The thesis explores the role qf uncertainty in an expert system and considers the
process of reasoning under uncertainty. The possible sources of uncertainty are
investigated and prove to be crucial to some aspects of the methodology.
A variety of Uncertainty Management Techniques (UMTs) are considered, including
numeric. symbolic. and hybrid methods. Considerably more information is found in
the literature on numeric methods, than the latter two. Methods that have been
proposed for comparing UMTs are studied and comparisons reported in the literature
are summarised. Again this concentrates on numeric methods. since there is more
literature available.
The requirements of a methodology for the selection of a UMT are considered. A
manual approach to the selection process is developed. The possibility of extending
the boundaries of knowledge stored in the expert system by including meta-data to
describe the handling of uncertainty in an expert system is then considered. This is
followed by suggestions taken from the literature for automating the process of
selection.
Finally consideration is given to whether the objectives of the research have been met
and recommendations are made for the next stage in researching a methodology for
the selection of a paradigm of reasoning under uncertainty in expert system
development.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
1. 1 Chapter overview
Chapter One introduces the tlicsis. which is concerned with the development of a
methodology for the selection of a paradigm of reasoning under uncertainty in
expert system development. The chapter explains the research that will be covered.
The significance of the study and the purpose of the study are described in the li t: ht
of literature material. The research questions are posed and the organisation of the
thesis is outlined.

1.2 Introduction to the thesis
This thesis is concerned with the investigation of paradigms of reasoning under
uncertainty that have been applied to expert systems. It wilJ consider in detail a
number of Uncertainty Management Techniques ( UMTs) and consider their
application. Procedures to compare UMTs will be investigated and an attempt
made to develop a methodology that can be used to select the appropriate UMT for
a particular expert system development.
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1.3 The significance of the study
The research topic outlined ahove. was suggested to me hy a (then) lecturer in
Compl •.er Science at Edith Cowan University. Mr. Tim Rohcrts. He has some
experience in the development of Diagnostil: Expert Systems. He had discovered
that although there were many iheorctical papers on the suhject of uncertainly in
expert systems. practical information on how to select a paradigm of reasoning
under uncertainty was not readily available.
Expert systems are designed to solve real-life problems. Such problems are often
not straightforward enough to be dealt with by the use of applied predicate calculus
-- as was hoped in the 1960s (Lucas & Van Der Gaag. 1991 ). Expert systems may
he distinguished from classical decision theory systems by the importance of the
"representation of knowledge in an explicit qualitative form rather than implicitly
in an algorithmic form" (Fox, Clark, Glowinski. O'Neil. 1990).
The real-life situations tackled by expert systems are often typified by a degree of
uncertainty. This may include imprecise or conflicting information. Since expert
system applications are designed to deal with real-life problems at the level of the
human expert, they must cope with uncertain information. However. uncertainty
does not arise from a single source and may arise even in completely deterministic
systems (Rothman, 1989). This concept is dealt with in more detail in section 2.5
Sources of uncertainty.
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In the development of expert systems that deal with uncertain information. the
selection of a paradigm of reasoni ng under u1H.:crtai nty is critical ( Hsu & Chu.
1 989) If uncertainty is not properly dealt with, the expert system may have an
illusion of precision ( Kerr. 1 992).
The largest group of expert systems that must deal with uncertainty are referred to
as diagnostic systems ( Weichsclbcrger & Pohl man. 1 990). This type of system is
most often connected with the medical field hut ex amples are also present in many
other fields including financial planning. accounting. geology, meteorology and
the control of technical i nstall ations.
Techniques have been developed specifically for handling uncertainty in expert
systems. For example Certainty Factors were developed for the early medical
expert system MYCIN (Shortliffe & Buchanan. 1 975 ). Others especial ly the
probability based methods have evol ved from long established mathematical
techniques (Bhatnagar & Kanai, 1 986). However, in the theory of the
management of uncertainty there is often criticism of Certainty factors as being
mathematically invalid. Is the criticism valid or is it enough for a technique to
produce satisfactory results? If so. then how should the selection of a method be
made and on what criteria should that selection be based?

10

1.4 The purpose of the study
Many di fferent paradigms for reasoning under uncertainty in expert systems h..ive
been proposed in the last twenty-five years. Most of them have hccn numeric
systems often hased. however loosely, on mathematical probabi lity. Some have
argued that the uncertainty i n expert systems cannot he combined into numeric
values (Cohen. 1 988 ). More recently there has been the development of hybrid
systems that have numeric and non-numeric components ( D'Ambrosio. 1 988)
( Cohen. 1 985 ) .
In recent years there has been an almost religious debate about which is the right
system to use for reasoning under uncertainty . Some have claimed that the
established mathematical probabil ity methods must be used (Cheeseman. 1 986)
( Li ndley. 1 985). whi lst others have clai med that new methods are required (Zadeh.
1 986). Max Henrion, in the preface to Uncertainty in Artificial Inteiligence 5
indicates that this debate is i nappropri ate ( Henri on. I 990). He suggests that it is not
possible to select one UMT over another by considering only the basic mechanics
or mathematical soundness of the theory. There are other practical considerations
that must also be made such as the reliability and complexity of calculations. In
addition users must be able to understand the model in order to provide data that
can be used with confidence .

ll

Hcnrion suggests that the criterion for succe'is of an approach io., its elTectivcnc..,..,
for appl ication. "The marketplace for idea.... . l i ke more tangi hlc goods. j .., ulti mately
ruled more hy consumers than producers . " ( llcnrion ct al. 1 91)0. p. v ) . Thi.., the.., , ..,
will explore the experience gai ned in the marketplace and look for
recommendations that can he made to "consumers" .
Clark agrees that attempts t o demonstrate that one particular UMT was the hcst for
all situations. were unfortunate . He concurs with the aim ot' this study '"to suggc ... 1
th(' most appropriate paradigm for a particular situation" (Clark. 1 990. p. I 40J.
Saffioti supports the argument that it is appropriate to identify the paradigm of
rea.,; oni ng under uncertainty that should be used for a given application ( Saffiot i .
1 988 ). Fox suggests that the debate about the correct way of deali ng with
uncertainty is unfortuuate. He submi ts rather that debate should focus on
considering the strengths and weaknesses of alternate methods of representi ng
uncertainty ( Fox, 1 986).
The objective of this study is to select from the many alternati ves. the most
appropriate paradigm for reasoning under uncertainty for a particular application .
Ginsherg ( 1 986) advises that comparing the theory o f UMTs is difficult . "The true
advantil.ges of the various cvmpeting paradigms w i l l only be apparent when these
1,1aradigms have been incorporated in full-scale systems." It is now true that many
paradigms are in use, and this thesis w i l l i nvestigate them. Howe ver. there
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cont:nue �o he theo;·ct ical developments that cannot he ignored. Where pm,!-.ihk:
lhesc developments will he given some consideration.

1.5 Statement of research questions
In the early stages of expert system development , the selection of a paradigm for
reasoning under uncertainty is important. However Hsu and Chu in their paper
"Practical issues in designing knowledge-based expert systems" ( Hsu & Chu,
1 989) identify the representation of uncertainty a� one area that is often neglected
in the design of an expert system. This is unfortunate. since an Uncertainty
Management Technique ( U MT) provides the expert system w ith a means of
assessing evidence and making credible inferences about hypotheses in an
indefinite environment.
This project has two aims.
1 . To define the criteria o n which the selection of a paradigm o f reasoning under
uncertainty for an expert system should be made.
2. To consider which recent advances in the theory of reasouing under uncertainty
are 1,1.1orthy of consideration for incorporation into expe11 system developments.
The first is the major aim and the thesis will be structured around this aim. The
second is considered to be of secondary i mportance and will be ccnsidered
alongside the first.
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In an altcmpt m answer 1hc:-.c quc,tion:-.. in forma1 mn will he galhcrcd from l wo
ma1or :-.oun:cs.
I.

The theory of reasoning under uncertainty. Then: i:-. a great deal of material
avail able in journals and books

'

Expert System applications. Detailed information on the succes" or failure of
the particular UMT used i:-. more di fficult to ohtain . There are a few w,elul
studies that discuss the attributes of system.'> in relation to their reasoning
under uncertainty.

1 .. 6 Organisation of the thesis
Chapter 2 sets the scene for this study. It outlines the structure of expert systems
and discusses how uncertainty may become a part of this structure. It discusses the
role of uncertainty and explains tlie process of reason ing under uncertainty. The
problem faced by the expert system developer of havi ng to select a paradigm o f
rea,on ing under uncertai nty i s described, sources of uncertainty are outl i ned and
the concept of validating expert systems is discussed.
Chapter 3 provides the detail of the major paradigms for reasoning under
uncertainty i n expert systems. Several numeric approaches are discussed at length.
whilst the symboli c and hybrid approaches receive rather less detailed
consideration. For each paradigm the advantages and disadvantages of the
technique are discussed and i n some cases the relationship to other UMTs is
clarified.
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Chapter -I hcg i ns hy considering strUL'l urc, hy wlm.:h compan,ons of paradigm, for
rL·asnnmg under m11:crtainty may he made . A l i ,t of t he requircmcnh of a t heory of
urn:ertainty management Jue 10 Boni ,sonc ! Bonis,onc. 1 987 ) i, discw,scd . A
comparison of techniques i s 1hcn made i n rhc 1 1ght of these idea!->.
Suggestions concerning how to select a speci fic UMT for a particular applicat ion
are to be found i n chapter 5. This includes a discussion of the process of making a
decision and the concepts of the e x pert systems t hat should be given cogni sance.
Chapter 6 concludes this study by considering whether the objectives have been
met and making recommendations for the next step in the study of this topic.
Fin al ly. a comprehensive bibliography is included at t he end of the thesis.

IS

Chapter 2: Expert Systems and reasoning
under uncertainty
2. 1 Chapter overview
This chapter explains the concept of an expert system. It considers the structure of
expert systems and how uncertainty may be incorporated into them. The reason ing
process is outlined. as are the required changes to reasoning when uncertainty is
involved. The requirement for an expert system developer to consider uncertainty
is discussed. Sources L'f uncertainty are investigated that will indeed prove
i mportant i n selecting the appropriate paradigm of reasoning under uncertainty.
Final ly the chapter considers the process of val idation of expert systems and
explains why this validation process is necessari ly di fferent from that in a system
that uses exact reason ing.

2..2 Expert systems
An expert system is designed to make judgments i n a complex field. It i s supposed
to make judgments at least as well as a human expert. This goal can be approached
from two different perspectives. The first is to concentrate solely on the results of
the system, if it makes the same recommendations as the human expert then that is
all that is required of the system. The second approach achieves the same results
16

hut pl.u..·l·, add11 1onal 1 mport ann· on the: rc:a,onmg prrn:c" t hal ad11cvcd t ho,c
rl·,ult,. Thi, prrn..·c....., ,hould he a, do,c a, ,.., po,, 1hk to the p,yd1ologH.:al
n.•.tsl1nmg prot..: c:-., t hat 1 , u,cd hy the human ex pert . It ha"' hcen argued that
hack\vard chaining use:-. a prm:c,.., t hat 1s .... imi lar to the human expert when
proposit ional data is used ( Neopol itan. I 990).
Backward chaining is t he proccs, of reasoning from a conclusion to proving the
facts that support that conclusion. Forward chaining is the reverse process of
reasoning from t he facts to the conc lusions that t he facts support. Both directiom,
of reasoni ng have been used by the inference engine of expert '>ystem'>. EM YCIN
uses backward chaining whilst OPS5 and CLIPS use forward chaining (Giarratano
& Riley. 1 994 ). Some inference engine'> actual ly allow both types of reasoning. A
backward chaining reasoning proces.., is usual ly more convergent simply because
irrelevant facts can be discarded immediate ly <Jackson, 1 990).
The greater number of expert system applicat ions may be defined as classification
problems (Ignizio. 1 99 1 ). Included here arc the di agnostic systems that given a set
of symptoms will attempt to diagnose the disease and also systems that consider
the cause of machinery fai lure. Since this type of system is attempting to establish
an hypothesis given the conclusion. backward c haining reasoning is preferable .
Forward chaining should be selected for other types of expert systems, those that
attempt to solve construction problems (lgnizio, 1 99 1 ). This includes expert
systems for prognosis, monitoring and control (Giarratano & Riley. 1 994). For
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examph: XCON was to advbc on ... ullahlc con figurat 1orh of VAX compulcr..,
l Mdkrmoll . I 982 I.
Expert systems generally work in a narrow domain. M YCIN . prohahly the world'..,
best known expert system was intended to he used for diagnc,..,is of in fcctiou..,
blood diseases {Shon l i ffc. 1 975 ). Dc ...pite thi .... complete certain know ledge of that
domain is the exception rather than the rule. Human expert.., very often must reach
dec isions with concepts that are unre liable. incomplete or inconsistent and expen
systems must do the same. Velverdc and Gehl emphasi ...e that expert systems must
be capable of managing uncertainty before they can thri ve in their i ntended field
and use their knowledge successfully ( Valverde & GehL 1 992 ).

2.3 Expert system structure
Expert systems are usual ly cm1:.idered to have three main components. a
knowledge base. inference engine and user interface. These componems
respectively represent, manipulate and communicate knowledge. In addition. most
systems aJso contain explanation and trace facilities. The interfaces between these
components are shown i n Fig 2. 1 . Explanation facilities arc primari ly for the expert
system user and will provide more i nformation on such questions as "How did you
reach that answer?". whereas trace facilities are for the knowledge engineer and
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will provide for stepping through the i nfcrcm:ing procc,, C Lm:a, & Van dcr Gaa):!.
1 99 1 ).

User Interface

Explanation
Facilities

Trace
Facilities

_____,.._.. -----·.---

r

Inference Engine

Knowledge Base
II'

I

Figure 2.1 The Structure of an Expert System
How does the processing of uncertainty fit into the structure of an expert system?
There are two possibilities. First from (Cortez-Rello and Golshani, 1 990) is the
separate approach that includes two addit:onal modules in an expert system, the
Belief base and Uncertainty module. They indicate that the Belief base
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c11nmum ii.:atcs with thl' Uncertainty module whic-1 1 m turn communicate'> wilh the
infcn:ncc engine. An in1cgrated approach wou ld include aspect.., of uncertainty m
,Il l the comp,mcnts of the ... y ...tc m. Si nce uncertainty mu'.'>t he rcpre1.,cntcd.
manipulated and communicated it will he a part of each of the three major
components. Boni ssonc endorse� the integrated approach
In building expert-system architectures three distinct layers must be
defined: representation, inference, and control layers. The treatment of
uncertainty must address each of these layers. (Bonissone, 1 987, p.
859)

Paul Cohen confirms that the integrated approach is important by emphasising that
the management of uncertainty ,;hould not be an after thought that is an addition to
a categorical inference system. He views uncertainty management as an .. integral
part of the problem sol ving process." (Cohen. 1 989. p. 263 )

2.4 The role of uncertainty in expert systems
Expert systems need to have the capabil ity to infer from premises that are
imprecise, incomplete or not total ly reliable, j ust as human experts function i n the
same situation. The strict implication, "for all x. A ( x ) implies B ( x)" is weakened
by some degree, expressed as a scalar value, to "for most x. A(x) implies B ( x )"
(Bonissone, 1987). Less formall y this statement has been phrased ·'the A's are B's"
or "generally the A's are B's". A group of French researchers investigated the ways
uncertainty was introduced into this statement in various formal isms. They used
the title, Lea Sombe, from the French "les A sont B" (Lea Sombe, J 990). Their
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Vl'rsions of this statement ex pre,sed w,mg vanou, parachpn, of rea,on ing undn
u ncl·rtainty will he considerl·d in the appropriate sec1 11 111, of Chapter �i .
The degree to which there is st ill a he licf in the impl ication ha, hccn cal led u
dt•grt't' cf hdh:{ ( S hafcr. 1 976). The funct ions that propagate degrees of hclicf over
inferences are cal led nm1himng jimctim1s. Some systems propagate two degrees of
belief. usually an upper and a lower bound. so indicating a range of values.
Bonissone explains the process of reason ing under uncertainty:
Facts must be aggregated to determine the degree to which the premise
of a given rule has been satisfied, to verify the extent to which external
constraints have been met, to propagate the amount of uncertainty
through the triggering of a given rule, to summarize the findings
provided be various rules or knowledge sources or experts, to detect
possible inconsistencies among the various sources, and to rank
different alternatives of different goals. (Bonissone, 1 987, p. 854).

Bob Avanzato. an expert system developer. was look ing for a suitable U MT to use
in an Acoustic S ignal Interpretation Expert System. He considered uncertainty to
be an integral part of the expert system. and emphasised the importance of this part
of the system. He felt that the U MT must he able to represent and reason with
uncertainty, and should encompass al l the facets of uncertainty in order to
guarantee success in the evolution and instal lation of the expert system ( Avanzato.
1 99 1 )(see Section 2 .5 Sources of uncertainty).
Some have seen the numerical approar.:hes to uncertainty as attempting to produce
results with excessive precision. Most numeric UMTs require numerical values
from the user as an accurate mea-;ure on a scalar or interval scale. They then
perform complex calculations that produce seemi ngly precise results. It has been
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suggested that this apparent aceurrn..:y may not he jus1 1 ficd l,!ivcn the d iffi<.:ulty of
ohtaining accurate init ial figures ( Bonissonc. I 987 ).

2.5 Sources of uncertainty.
It would be convenient 10 package al l forms of uncenainty i nto a single bu ndle and
deal with this in a consistent manner throughout the ex pen system. Bonissone
reminds us that uncertainty is not a single i ssue.
the presence of uncertainty in reasoning systems is caused by a variety
of sources: the reliability of the information, the i nherent imprecision of
the representation language in which the information is conveyed, the
incompleteness of the information, and the aggregation or summarization
of information from multiple sources. (Bonissone, 1 987 , p. 854)

All uncertainty involved in expen systems then. does not arise from a single
source. In fact it may be inappropriate to package several d ifferent concepts
together when considering expert systems or any reasoning system. Ng and
Abramson ( 1 990, p. 30) identify the same four sources of uncertai nty as Bonissone
but use diffe-�nt terminology. Each will be considered individually.
I . Lack of prec ision of knowledge/natural language.
Ambiguities may not be c larified during translation to a formal language.
Thus it may be necessary to allow for the imperfect matching of facts w ith
premises. Statements such as "the economy ha,;; a low inflation rate" are
imprecise (Bhatnagar & Kanal, I 992).
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�. ll nrcl iahk i n formation.
May he due to:
I.

Ill-defined domain concepts.
Inaccurate data possibly due to poor re liabil ity of im,trument!'> used to
make the observations.

3.

Weak i mpl ications may occur becau!'>e the system builder is not able to
estahlish a concrete relationship between the antecedent and
consequent .

This is perhaps the only true ' Uncertainty of knowledge ' ( B hatnagar &
Kane!. 1 992 ) .

3 . Incomplete information.
Partial i nformation results when the answers to questions are unknown.
Approximate pattern matching is required here also. Boni ssone ( Bonissone.
1 987) suggests that this type of uncertainty has often been modelled by non
numerical methods.
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4. Disagrccmcnl amungsl expert,,
Con tl i.:l ing i n fomrnl ion from a numhcr o f -.ourcc-. will rc-.uh in com:lw,ion, 1hat
arc suspect. Bonissonc point-. oul that when unconditional fact-. arc comhincd three
possible problems may appear:
•

the single-valued certainty measure may be combined into an
interval-value

•

the combination of conflicting statements could generate a
contradiction

o

the rule of evidence may create an overestimate of the
aggregated fact if a normalization is used to hide a
contradiction . This was shown possible by Zadeh cited by
Bonissone (Bonissone, 1 987) .

It has been shown that it is possible that a consensus can be reached b y
weighting each source. ( depending o n the expertise o f the source ) and thus
calcul ating composite information. It would however be difficult to define
the weights since this requires a weight for each expert and experts do not
have uniform expertise across their domain ( Ng & Abramson. 1 990).
Graham ( 1 99 1 ) suggests that it is important to consider two di fferent kinds of
uncertainty arisi ng from:
1.

Natural variation
This includes such concepts as probability and possibility that can be
handled by statistical and fuzzy methods respectively (in Graham's view)
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Conc.:eptuul apprehension.
This includes ideas of vagucne,,. v,iriatHHb m hcl ic f. dcgn.:: c, of truth. etc
It wou ld appear then that only the first of Ng and Ahramson\ concepts i, part of
the first of Graham' s. The second. third and fourth listed hy Ng and Abramson
however can all he included as Graham ' s second.
This thesis agrees with van der Lubhe and colleages that the type of uncertainty is
cruc ial to the selection of an appropriate par<1digm of reasoning under uncertai nty
for a g1\'en appl ication ( van der Lubbe. B acker & Krijgman. 1 99 1 ).

2.6 Reasoning under Uncertainty
Exact reasoning invol ves the use of exact facts and exact conclusions follow. In a
deductive argument, the conclusion must fol low from the premises. When facts are
uncertain there may be a great number of possible conclusions and the problem
becomes selecting the best conclusion .
When reasoning under uncertainty, a conc lusion may be arrived at with less than
1 00% certainty. A doctor may diagnose a certain treatment because it appears
likely the patient has a disease. The treatment may be the correct decision without
confirmation of the diagnosis if there are few side effects to the treatment il nd the
cost (in time or money) of confirming the diagnosis is great.
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It j.., not c.:lc�tr how hunmn expert-. repre..,ent and reason under uncerta111ty. Some
have argued th�1t a form of "logic .. 1.., U<,ed. others tlwt human.., at.:l ually evaluate
probahil itic.... At the other ern.1 of the spectrum arc tho..,c t hat ..,uggc..,t that no
explicit representations arc w,ctl (Graham. 1 99 1 J. Whatever the method. it j.., true
that experts can make "useful and mcamngful rccommcndatiom," e ven when faced
with imprecise and uncertain in formation (Clarke. McLei!>h & Vyn. 1 99 1 J.
If the presence of uncertain':: is acknowledged and a method of approximate
reasoning is to be included in an expert system then there remain two major
problems that must be resolved:
•

how to measure the degree of inexactness and calculate certainty
factors for inexact situations,

•

how to propagate uncertainty in making inferences and arrive at best
conclusions in spite of some rules not being definite.

(Cortes-Rello and Golshani, 1 990, p. 9)

These problems can be summarised as how to represent and reason with
uncertainty. Chapter 3 considers various possible paradigms for reasoning under
uncertainty. Each provides its own solution to these problems.
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2. 7 The problem for an expert system
developer.
Some expert system developers have not considered including the ha.11dl ing of
uncertainty in thei1 systems. This has resulted in what Kerr referred to as an
"illusion of precision" ( Kerr. 1 992 ). He reported that ir. some (scheduling) systems
the lack of approximate reasoning can resul t in large numbers of calculations when
minor data changes are made. So the lack of a method for deal ing with uncertainty
can result in major problems for the expert system.

The handling of uncertainty in expert systems is a complex task that has several
possible solutions. There are no simple methods to provide an answer to the
question "which UMT is appropriate for my expert system? " . Expert systems are
being asked to solve more challanging problems that involve many types of
uncertainty and i t is therefore becoming essential that the designers of expert
systems are able to select a U MT that is appropriate (Avanzato, l 99 l ).

Bonissone describes a change in view that has occuned in the process of looking
for an appropriate method for dealing with uncertainty.

The search for a normative uncertainty theory to be used in reasoning
systems has long been a major driving force in our research community .
. . . . . More recently, these controversies have subsided, and a slightly
more tolerant view has emerged. Uncertainty tools have been divided
into extensional and intentional approaches, according to their respective
focus on computational efficiency or purer semantics[Pearl, 1 988]. There
has been an increased awareness of classes of problems requiring a
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prescriptive rather than a normative approach to reasoning with
uncertainty. (Bonissone, 1 990, p. 237)

So it is no longer a matter of selecting the nwtlwd of reasoning under uncertainty
that is appropriate for expert systems. Rather a matter of selecting the method that
is appropriate for a particular expert system ( or set of similar systems).
This research aims to provide assistance in this selection. Chapter 4 compares
paradigms of reasoning under uncertainty and Chapter 5 provides a methodology
for the selection of an appropriate method.

2.8 Validation of expert systems -- its
implication for UMT's.
Definitions of expert systems often include some mention of the notion that they
can function at close to human expert levels (O'Keefe. Balci & Smith. 1 987 ). They
are usually expert only in a narrow domain. can produce recommendations. make
enquiries to complete gaps in their knowledge and often explai n how a conclusion
has been reached (Graham, 1 99 l ). It is imperative that the expert system is able to
supply accurate responses and perform in a manner that is dependable (Guida &
Spampinato, 1 989).
Quality assurance is a concept that has recently become important in almost every
endeavor. Yet in the past, the quality of many systems was rarely tested rigorously
to ascertain if a satisfactory level of perforrnanC;e was achieved. As with all other
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software. expert systems should undergo hoth validation and veri fic.:at ion .
Validatlon meam, suhstantiating that the -.yslem performs accurately, whi ht
veri fication is substant iating that a sy-.tern has implemented its speci fication. Yet
this terminology docs not in itse l f define a c.:lear methodology that will allow the
quality ot an expert systems to be assured.
It is likely to be a longer process to validate an expert system that uses rea'.'>oni ng

under uncertainty than a system with a crisp reasoning process (Chang & Hall.
1 992 ). I n addi tion the importance o f testing any system wil i depend o n the nature
of advice given by the system and whether anything critical is at stake i f an
i ncorrect decision is made by the system. A critical domain ha" been defined as one
"where the occurrence of inappropriate or incorrect decision may cause damage"
(Guida & Spampinato, 1 989). It is ea-;y to i maging damage occurring i f incorrect
decisions were made in many medical and industrial fields.
It is worthwhi le considering what it is that is to be validated, especial ly in an expert

system that reasons under uncertainty. Guida and Spampinato in their paper
"Assuring adequacy of expert systems in critical application domains" distinguish
two fundamental parts of the yuali ty process (Guida & Spaminato, 1 989). These
are the external behaviour and the internal ontology. The former can be observed as
the results of the system but the later deals with the structure (knowledge
representation and reasoning algorithms) and content ( knowledge base) of the
system.
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It could he argued for example thal an expert system that produces safo-fuctory
( valid) resulls shou ld he acceptable : M YCIN has received support of this kind
( l lorvitz & Hcckcrman . 1 986 ). However it is a more widely held view that the
internal ontology including the reasoning proces!'. itself should he validated. not
simply the results it produces (O'Kccfe. Balci & Smith. 1 987 J <Guida &
Sparnpinato. 1 989) . Some suggest it would be unreasonable to extend the
knowledge base or scale up to a l arger application domain, a system that had a poor
reasoning process. The implication of this argument to UMTs is that they must not
only be shown to produce reasonable results but must support a valid reasoning
process.
An order has been suggested to this val idation process. The inference engine.
knowledge acquisition faci lity and explanation facil ity should be validated first.
This is because these parts of the system are the most procedural and therefore
standard methods as used for more general computer systems could be used. This
may be the easier part of the validation when compared to val idating the
knowledge base (Hollnagel, 1 989). The performance of the system is heavily
reliant on the structure and content of the knowledge base. Consequently the
system must be validated continuously throughout the life of the system every time
the knowledge base is updated.
The validation process requires some known or expected behaviours to validate
against. It is important that these should not have been used in the development of
the system. The opinion of an expert or group of experts should normal l y be used
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bul i n some problem domains ii may be feasible to use known result, instead
lChang & HalL 1 992 ). There may he a di fficulty i f 1,1e val idalion foils in
determining whether the error is in the expert system or i.., with the tc..,t rc..,u ll'>
thcmsc I vcs.
The validation of an imprecise or fuzzy expert system ha., an additional level of
complexity. Not only must the correct recommenda�ion be made by the ...ystcm hut
it must be made with an appropriate strength. In a system using fuzzy logic -- "the
fuzzy set defined by the conclusion must be within t he acceptable bounds of its
possible range" (Chang & Hall , 1 992. p. 600 ).
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Chapter 3: The theory and practice of
uncertainty management
3. 1 Chapter overview
This chapter discusses the variety of melhods lhat have been sugge..,ted for handling
reasoning under uncertainty in expert systems. The UMTs presented here are divided
into three main groups, numeric. symbolic and hybrid (which is a combination of the
previous two).
In this chapter each technique is presented. advantages and disadvantages of the
techniques are discussed and in some cases the relationship to other UMTs is clarified.
An objective comparison of paradigms for reasoning under uncertainty may be found
in chapter 4, whilst suggestions a-; to how to select a specific UMT for a particular
application are to be found in chapter 5. Figure 3. 1 on the next page shows various
classifications of UMTs that will be considered.
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F ig 3.1 Paradigms of reasoning under uncertainty

3.2 Numeric approaches
3.2.1 Bayesian
Probability is the oldest and most widely used formalism for representing uncertainty.
Shafer and Pearl ( 1 990) explain that the concept of the degree of probability was used
"in law and philosophy before mathematical probability was invented" (Shafer &
Pearl, 1 990). Scholars developed mathematical probabi lity in the late 1 600s and early
1 700s. James Bernoulli's book Art of Conjecture was one of the first books on
mathematical probability and from the title it can be seen that he intended the theory as
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a mechanism for plausihlc reasoning .
The frcqucmist view of probability did not emerge until the mid nine teenth century
(Shafer & Pearl. 1 990). The frcqucntist view leads to the most widely used description
of Classical Probability Theory. that it is used for games involving the toss of a coin
and the throw of a dice. From this point of view. probabilitie!-1 arc defined a-; the
proportion in the long run. a frequency interpretation of probability.
The original account of probability is more useful for Expert Systems , thi s is to
interpret probabilities as personal or subjective evaluations (Freund, 1 972, p. 36 ). The
probability of a proposition is a measure of a person's degree oi belief in it, given the
person's current level of information. A probabil ity is the degree of belief in a
particular proposition. (Cheeseman. I 986. p. 86). Hunter agrees with this interpretation
... for there are decision problems involving uncertainties that cannot plausibly be
given a frequency interpretation, but which are really uncertainties about the truth
of non-vague propositions.
(Hunter, 1 986, p. 209)

Zadeh, the inventor of Fuzzy Sets. (Zadeh. 1 986) has the opinion that probability is
not appropriately expressive for representing the many kinds of uncertainty that can be
found in expert systems. He also believes that most probabilit ies are not known with
"sufficient precision to be representable as real numbers" . Zadeh prefers fuzzy
tenninology such as likely, unlikely and not very likely.
Hunter maintains that Zadeh's interpretation of probabi lity, as being unabie to
represent vagueness, is i ncorrect. Hunter also distinguish. , ��· ween static and
dynamic views of uncertainty. He asserts that for a complete theory of uncertain
reasoning, the static probabil ity theory must be combined with a dynamic theory.
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(he suggests Maximum Entropy Theory) which i� conc.:crncd with how one's degree of
bel ief should change in the light nf new cvidcm.:c.

3.1. 1.1 Probability - the basics
Let A be an event . Then S i s the set of all possible events called the Sample Space.
The probability of event A is denoted P( A). The probability mea�ures must satisfy
three given postulates. (Freund. 1 972. p. 38)

1. P (A) >= 0 . for any subset A of S.
2. P(S) = I .

3 . If A l · A2, A3 , . . . . is a sequence of disjoint subsets of S. then

Further rules that can be derived include
a} Probabilities cannot exceed one
b) The probabilities of A and not A, sum to 1 .
Postulate 3 is the addition rule for mutually exclusive events. But if events are not
mutually exclusive
eg. P(student 90 1 087 will pass Intermediate Algebra) and
P(student 901 087 wilJ pass Advanced Algebra)
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then the appropriate rule for addition of prohahi litics is

P( A U B)

n

P( A ) + P( B l - PC A B )

3.2. 1 .2 Conditional probability
Any measure of probability is relative to the sample space, thus PC student 90 1 087 will
score top grade in Advanced Programming) may vary depending on whether S, the
sample space includes students from one or all campuses. To clarify this P( AIS ) is the
conditional probability of event A relative to the sample space S. (Freund, 1 972, p.
5 1 ).
When considering two events. A and B . The conditional probability of A given B, is
the probability of event A occurring given that event B ha-; occurred. This is defined a.,;
P(AIB ) = P(A and B ) I P(B )
or altemative]y i n the Bayes rule format.
P(AIB) = ( P(BIA) * P(A ) ) I P(B)
Another description of conditional probability that is more directly useful i n expert
systems is that, the conditional probability of a hypothesis P(HIE) is the probability of
the hypothesis in the light of the evidence E ( Lee, Grize & Dehnad, 1 987).

3.2.1.2.1 Bayes Theorem
B ayes Theorem al]ows for the calculation of the updated degree of belief in a
hypothesis when new evidence becomes availab]e. For a given hypothesis H k , there is
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a prior probability that it is true. P( fl,

) .

In the light of new evidence our bel ief i .e.,

altered to produce a posterior probability. P( flt I /:· ) for the hypothcc.,i:-. f/ 1

p( H 4 I E ) =

:

P( H 4 l P( EI H, )
P( E l

Bayes rule can be used t o infer the probability o f a disea,e from the given symptoms. if
one has knowledge of the probability of the symptoms gi ven each disease. and the
prior probability of each disease (Neapolitan, 1 992).
Lee and Clark provide examples of the application of Bayes Theorem in the expert
system domain (Lee et al. 1 987. p. 1 8 ) (Clark. 1 990, p. 1 1 4 ).
Expert systems can reason through forward-chaining or backward-chaining processes.
Bayes Theorem is appropriate for either type of reasoning. Thus if probablilities are
more readily available to support reasoning in a certain direction. Bayes Theorem can
be adapted to support that direction of argument (Valverde. 1 992).
A particular version of Bayes Theorem is pertinent to the question of assessing a set of
competing hypotheses in the light of a set of evidence (Valverde, 1 992 ). There are
dangers in progressively updating an assessment in the light of a new piece of
evidence. It is vital that the interelationships between separate pieces of evidence be
considered so that conflicts will become evident rather than be submerged. (Buxton,
1989)
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3.2.1 .2.2 Independent Events
Two events arc independent if the occurrence of one has no ef ect on the occurrence of
f

the other. Then by definition P( AIB ) = P( A ) and P( BIA) = P( B).
3.2.1 .2.3 Probabilities in Expert Systems
When an expert system is based on Bayesian probability many probability values are
required. These will be provided by the domain expert and will be both the estimates
of the probability of hypotheses and also the probability of hypotheses in the light of
evidence.
Valverde and Gehl (1992) report on an expert system used to determine an accurate
diagnosis of the reao;on for Boiler tube failure in fossil fuel driven power plants. They
implemented two systems, one using a Bayesian model and the other using Dempster
Shafer (see Section 3.2.3 Dempster-Shafer belief theory). They report that it was
possible to acquire estimates of probabilities from actual data. The historical records of
observed causes of failure in the boiler provided the required estimates of relative
frequencies (Valverde &Gehl, 1992).
Where historical information is not available the probabilities required by an expert
system must be provided by human experts. This will usually include all prior and
conditional probabilities. The required amount of data grows exponentially with the
number of hypotheses. This, together with the enormous amount of computational
effort required when new evidence becomes available provides the reason that full
probabilistic representations have not been popular in expert system development
(Wise &Henrion, 1 986).
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Bayes Theorem must he adapted in the case that the evidence itself is uncertain. The
changes required arc due to the intcrl inkcu nature of system, and the use of Bayes
theorem to calculate posterior prohabi litics ( Lee ct al., 1 987).
They also identify four 'signi ficant drawbacks' in using Bayesian techniques in expert
systems (Lee ct al. . 1 987).
I.

The subject ive nature of the ass ignments of probabil ity by a domain ex pert may
lead to a set of probabilities that are internall y inconsistent. This can be prevented
but on ly through a lot of work on the part of the domain expert and the
knowledge engineer.

2.

The hypotheses that are used in Bayes theorem are assumed to be disjoint. This
requirement may not be practical.

3.

If disjoint sets o f hypothesis cannot be achieved then the results achieved may
not be valid.

4.

A single change to the probabil ity of an event requires the recalculation of many
probabilities.

Although Bayesian inference is the most common strategy used in expert systems,
there are some situations where it is inappropriate (Neopolitan . 1 992). S uch situations
are those in which a probability cannot be assigned to al l pertinent events. In this
instance, other techniques such as Dempster�Shafer may be appropriate (see Section

3.2.3 Dempster-Shafer belief theory}.
The next section considers two early and yet successful expert systems that were based
on probability, but in different ways .
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3.2. 1.3 Some examples of probability based expert systems
In this section the thesis will consider two ex pert sy..,terrn. that u..,ed prohahiiity lo
handle uncertainty. The first ex pert system. Prospector was reported lo be re..,pon..,ihlc
for making a great deal of money. The second. Inferno wa.., ahle to make
recommendations even when provided with certain inconsi..,tent information.

3.2.1 .3.1 Prospector
This expert system was intended as an aid to geologists in their search for ore deposits
and its fame is based on its success (Dan & Dudeck, 1 99 2 ) .
Prospector's designers intended that the system would provide answers that were
"reasonably close approximations" to those that would result from the use of
probability analysis ( Yadrick et al. 1 988, p. 8 1 ). The uncertainty handl ing mechanism
is regarded as having a stronger theoretical foundation than that of MYClN's certainty
factors and therefore "it has not been reviewed in a critical way" ( Dan & Dudeck.
1 992 ). Prospector used an inference network to identify dependent probabilities. This
was an early version of the Bayesian Belief Network (See section 3. 2 . 1 .4 Bayesian
Belief Networks).

3.2.1 .3.2 Inferno

Quilin's Inferno( 1 9�3) is a probabaJistic inference system that solves some of the
problems of earlier systems. Inferno can make inferences in a cyclic way. n desirable
but unaccomplished feature in systems like Prospector. Inferno is able to use both
forward and backward chai ning in its reasoning process (Section 2 .2 Expert Systems).
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An�,ther uncommon feature or Inferno is its ahility lo deal with inconsistent
information. If information is inconsi stent, Inferno can make thi!s fact evident along
with some alternative ways that the in formation could he made consistent. However
the appropriateness of this feature has heen questioned (Cheeseman 1 985 ).

3.2. 1.4 Bayesia11 Belief Networks
B ayesian Belief Networks in respect to expert systems have their origins in the
infen=nce networks of Prospector. They are bal.ied on probability theory and have been
largely developed to their current form by Pearl. However the Bayesian Network is
an annotated directed graph and was first used by the statistician Wright in 1 92 1 for
the analysis of crop failure (Heckerman, Mamdani & Wel l man. 1 995 ).
A belief network representation consists of two components, a qual itati ve directed
acyclic graph (DAG) that demonstrated the existence of probabi listic dependence
between variables and a quantitative set of conditional probability tables for the graph.
A belief network has to be sparse if it is to be comprehensible to the user and
i nference using the network is to be computationally tractable (Srinivas, Russel l &
Agogino, 1 990). This is a technique which allows for the explicit representation of
dependencies as wel l as independencies, thus allowing the experts to accurately
represent their beliefs with respect to some domain. One of Heckerrnan's objections to
Certainty factors was that they did not allow any such expl icit representation and thus
were ambiguous with respect to dependence or i ndependence (Heckerman, 1 986).
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The belief network is seen as a real istic approach to huilding expert systems. It solves
some of the short comings of the Certainty factor model whi lst not requiring the huge
volumes of data of classical probabilty ( Heckermann & Shortliffc. 1 99 2 ).The
requirement that the relation:-. between variables he specified by a conditional
probability matrix. forces the knowledge engineer to consider the various
combinations of variable values (Morowski, 1 989).
Booker, Hota and Ramsey ( 1 990) suggest that bel ief networks solve one of the
commonly made mistakes of early systems - the idea that uncertain inferences are
modular. They developed B aRT a Bayesian Reasoning Tool for knowledge based
systems, to "make state of the art techniques for uncertain reasoning avai lable to
researchers concerned with the clac;sificatory problem solving" (Booker. Hota and
Ramsey , 1 990, p.280). Its designers claim that BaRT is efficient and practical for
real appl ications.

3.2.1.5 Probability in practice
One of the most common criticisms of the use of probabil ity theory i n expert systems
is that the theory is impractical to apply in realistic situations. Heckerman and others at
Stanford converted Quick Medical Reference (QMR), one of the largest medical
expert systems in existence, to a probabilistic framework (Heckermann, 1 990). This
was largely successful although several assumptions were made which may not always
be present in other systems. One of the assumptions was that the variables under
consideration (diseases and findings) were binary. A second that diseases are
marginally independent is probably the most important in allowing them to limit the
total quantity of data required and the least likely to apply in general.
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It has hccn shown t hat i f the rc4uircmcnt to provide an ex ponent ial quantity of data
can be control led, perhaps hy some feature of the prohlcm domain C a!> in QMR ahove J,
then probability can be usefully applied.
An algorithm for computing the posterior probability of each disease given a set
of observed findings. is presented. Although the time complexity is exponential in
the number of positive findings, the algorithm is useful in practice because the
number of observed positive findings is usually far less than the number of
diseases under consideration. (Heckerman, 1 990, p. 1 63)
There has been much discussion. about the rel i ability of the probabil ity estimates
el icited from human experts, since the earliest expert systems attempted to use
numerical representations of uncertainty. This can be seen as less of a problem if these
numerical estimates are considered a starting point that wil l be re fined over time as the
system is used. The abil ity of systems that use probabilistic representations to rea<;on
and produce reasonable results even with inaccurate numeric a<;sessments can also be
seen as a strength of the representation (Spiegel halter, Franklin & Bull, 1 990).
It may be that the amount of research carried out and the stability of the domain may
affect the reliabi l ity of the probabil ity estimates. Studies have shown that in certain
domains probability assessments can be dependable although they may lean to more
extreme values (Spiegelhalter, Franklin & 81111, I 990).
In this area, as i n many others, the capabilities of modem computers are making it
feasible to solve problems that were previously considered not practical. Programs
that implement complex algorithms will execute within a reasonable time on today's
computers where they could not have been considered practical 20 years ago
(Heckennann and Shortliffe, 1992). Heckennan, Mamdani and WelJman report that
small powerful computers and GUI interfaces have made Bayesian networks a more
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common choice for expert system applications in a numhcr of different fields.
including diagnosis, forecasting and manufacturing control ( Heckerman, Mamdani &
Wellman. 1 995 ).

3.2.2 Certainty factors
One of the earliest and most widely used methods for reasoning under uncertainty in
ex.pert systems is the Certainty factors (CF) of MYCIN (Shortliffe & Buchanan. 1 975),
( Dan & Dudeck, 1 992). EMYCIN ( Empty M YCIN ) is an expert system shell which
made CF available for other expert system developments. Shortliffe and Buchanan
developed CF in the mid- 1970s specifically to be used with MYCIN, an expert system
for the diagnosis and treatment of meni ngitis and bacteraemia.
Our certainty factor model was developed in response to our desire to deal with
uncertainty while attempting to keep knowledge modular and in rules. (Buchanan
& Shortliffe, 1 984, p. 56)

Certainty factors were introduced in the well-known expert system MYCIN and
remain one of the most used uncertainty management paradigms. Certainty factors
were devised because their creators felt good enough data did not exist to create a full
statistical database for the medical application (Ng and Abramson, 1 990). There are
also indications that the artificial inteHigence research community felt that full
probability theory would prove too cumbersome (Heckermann & S hortliffe, 1 992). At
the time some probabilistic diagnostic medical systems used a 'simple Bayes' model.
These included assumptions of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses and
conditional independence. The assumptions were made for practical reasons. They
made it possible to build diagnostic systems wherea,; without them the volume of
probability estimates required and the complexity of calculations would have been
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restrictive. It is clear however, that the assumptions were unfaithful to the domain
( Heckcrmann & Shortliffc, 1 992 ).

3.2.2. I The mechallics of Certai11ty factors
When Certainty factors are used. the knowledge base has the form:
If <evidence> then CF <hypothesis>.
CFs have values between - 1 and I which represent the change in belief about a
hypothesis given some evidence. Certainty factors were originally defined in terms of
probability. a probability of I corresponding to a CF of I and a probability of O
corresponding to a CF of - 1 . A CF of O represents the situation of using the prior
probability. ''Piece wise linear interpolation is used between these three points " ( Wise
and Henrion. 1 986, p. 72) .
An inference network of the connecting rules exists and they are combined using
parallel and sequential combination as appropriate. These rules were devised by
Shortliffe and Buchanan as approximations of related statistical techniques and
showed that they satisfied certain intuitive properties. One such property is that
parallel combination should be commutative (Heckermann, l 986) . If all evidence and
hypothesis in the knowledge base are simple propositions then only the serial and
parallel combination rules are required.
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3.2.2.1 .1 Parallel Combination Function

CF,

=

,f

CF, + CF! - CF; CF:

Cf; . cf:.

CF, + CF! + CF. ('f�

l ( CF; + CF, ) I { I - min( I Cf� I . I CF 1 )

�o

Cf; . CF! ::; 0

1

otlu.•n1:i.w:

For example two pieces of evidence which support the same hypothesis result in a
greater certainty factor. For CF I

= 0.8 and CF2 = 0.9 then

CF3 = 0.8 + 0.9 - (0. 8)(0.9) = 0.98
3.2.2.1 .2 Serial Combination Function

The combination function is used to combine two rules where the hypothesis in the
first rule is the evidence in the second rule.
CF =

{CF.I CF,

3.2.2.1 .3 Combination of Rules with Conjunctions and Disjunctions

Suppose the knowledge ba<;e contains rules of the form:
R I : if A AND B then C. Cf 1 = 0.9
R2: if X then A. CFz = 0. 7
R3: if Y then B, CF3 = 0.9
The new composite rule (R4) can be created and the Certainty factors combined with
the following combination function:
R4: if X AND Y then C, CF4
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The minimum of the Certainty factors is used for comhinacion in a conjunction and
the maximum for a disjunction.
The parallel-combination function appeared in a di fferent form in the earliest of the
CF models. The terms Measure of belief (MB) and Measure of disbelief (MD) were
used (for positive and negative CF) and the final CF wa;; given as; the di fference
between MD and MB.
Variations to the model have been made in implementations of it. For example in
MYCIN Certainty factors of 0.2 or less are treated as i f they were O (Heckerrnann &
Shortli ffe, 1 992, p. 3 9). This meant that where there was very little probability (<0.2)
of an hypothesis being used, it would be discarded thus avoiding pointless questions
to the user of the expert system.

3.2.2.2 A critique of Certainty factors
The CF model was created for the domain of MYCIN and in blinded evaluat ions ha-;
been shown to provide recommendations for treatment equivalent to, or better than
human experts (Heckermann & Shortliffe, 1 992).
Two reasons have been suggested for the success of thi s method of modelling
uncertainty. Certainty factors are relatively simple to implement when compared to
other methods and the resulting modular knowledge base is helpful to the developer
(Dan & Dudeck, 1 992).
Heckermann has shown that the statistical definition of CF and the rules for
combination show some gross i nconsistencies. He suggests that the definition he
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ahandoncd i n favour of one which works statistically ( Hcckcrmann, 1 986).
Certainty fm.:tors an.! isomorphic to a suhsct of probability theory under an appropriate
set of ussumptions ( Rothmun. l 989 ). One of these assumptions is conditional
i ndependence of evidence given an hypothesis. This is a very strong assumption and
is not the case in all rules i n all expert systems. However, this system has been shown
to be successful ( Yu. Buchanan. Shortliffe et al., 1 979). Buchanan and Shortl i ffe, the
creators of Certainty factors wrote, . .the motives were l argely pragmatic, we justified
the underlying a-;sumptions by emphasizing the system· s excellent
perforrnance"(Buchanan & Shortliffe. 1 984).
Horvitz and Heckerman ( 1 986 ) highli ght a m isuse of Certainty factors and provi de
examples of the problem i n two well known ex pen systems . They suggest that the
problem stems from the inab iiity to distinguish between a change in belief and an
absolute meai,ure of belief.
Positive certainty factors then, correspond to an increase in belief while
negative certainty factors correspond to a decrease in belief. While certainty
factors were intended to represent measure of belief update, they were elicited
from experts as absolute beliefs. In particular certainty factors were elicited from
experts with the phrase "On a scale of one to ten, how much certainty do you
affix this conclusion?" (Horvitz and Heckerman, 1 986, p. 1 46)
Certainty factors can produce some apparently il1ogical results. It is demonstrated that
CF values can be the opposite of the conditional probabilities with the fol lowing
example (Giarratano & Riley, 1 994).

then

P(H 1 )

= 0.8

P(H 1 I E)

= 0.9

CF (H 1 . E)

= 0.5

P(Hz)

= 0.2

= 0.8
CF( Hz, E)

= 0.75
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Since one purpose of CF is to rank hypotheses in terms of likely diagnosis, it is
a contradiction for a disease to have a higher conditional probability (P(HIE) and
yet have a lower certainty factor, CF(H.E). (Giarratano & Ailey, 1 994, p. 268) .

Adams had reported the same prohlcm using the same example several year.., earlier
l Adams. 1 985 ). It has heen shown that these contradictory results arc quite
reasonahle ( Dan & Dudeck, 1 992). The real problem may he that highlighted by
Horvitz and Heckerman above, which is whether CF's measure absolute belief or a
change in belief. So in the example above. the results are contradictory. if CF's are
absolute measures of belief. However if CF's are measures of bel ief updating then the
fact that CF(H J , E) < CF( H 2 . E) results from P(H t ) > P( Hz) and P(H I IE) >P(H 2 IE)
should not be surprising. It simply shows that the evidence E has provided for a
greater increase in bel ief in hypothesis 1 than hypothesis 2 .
The operational definition of CF is preferred by some researchers. They suggest that
this is appropriate since CF's are elicited from domain expens as absolute beliefs,
used by the inference engine as absolute bel iefs and have results interpreted as if they
were absolute beliefs. They suggest changes to the computations of the system to
maintain consistency with this(Dan & Dudeck, 1 99 2 ) .
S o Certainty factors were el icited without a clear operational definition. However
MYCIN performs as well as experts in the field. This suggests that detailed
considerations of uncertainty are not critical to the systems performance. Indeed it has
been shown that performance does not change significantly when many of the
certainty factors in the knowledge base were changed (Heckerman, 1 986). Avanzato
(Avanzato, 199 1 ) agrees with Heckerman. he states that the CF model has been
shown to be equivalent to probability theory with the additional assumption of
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:-.tatistical i ndependence. Adams is cited hy Avanzato a.'> concluding that the success
of MYCIN despite the theoretical difficulties is
due to the fact that MYClN uses short chains of reasoning and simple
hypothesis. (Avanzato, 1 99 1 , p. i'O)

However MYCIN's creators were interested first in getting a system that worked.
They were not principally mot i vated with the mathematical correctness of their UMT
but more especially concerned with design ing a system that performed well in a
particular medical area. Some of the problems may have since arisen by the use of
Cenainty factors in other domains that are unsuitable for its reasoning process
(Horvitz & Heckerman, 1 986).
To be more specific, there are features of MYCIN's problem domain that are unusual
( Heckerman & Shortliffe, 1 992). MYCIN's therapy recommendations are invariant to
changes in the CF values, whereas the diagnostic assessments degrade more rapidly.
However MYCIN is primarily a therapy advice system and the antibiotics
recommended often cover several diagnostic assessments. Thus Heckerman and
Shortliffe emphasise that
"the CF model may be inadequate for diagnostic systems or in domains where
appropriate recommendations of treatment are more sensitive to accurate
diagnosis. Unfortunately, this point has been missed by many investigators who
have built expert systems using CFs" (Heckerman & Shortliffe, 1 992, p.36).

3.2.3 Dempster-Shafer belief theory
The belief theory was originally developed by Dempster (Dempster, 1 967) and
extended by Shafer (Shafer, 1 976). It attempts to provide a measurable means of
defining the concept of belief, which relates to "our conviction in the truth of some
statement" (Valverde &Gehl, 1992). Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory is a
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general isation that was designed to take into account a short coming of prohahility
theory. that is it cannot explicitly represent ignorance. D-S is ah .o ahlc to loosen the
requirement for prior and conditional probabilities ( Avanzato, 1 990).

The essence of the Dempster-Shafer theory is that the language of bel ief functions is a
general isation of the Bayesian language ( Shafer. 1 986 ). Shafer states that a belieffunction argument differs from a Bayesian argument in that the former involves a
probability model for the 'evidence bearing on the question· whereas the latter
i nvolves a probability model for the ' answer to the question · . The belief-function
generalisation makes it possible to use certain kinds of i ncomplete probabil ity models.

So the use of belief-functions allows for the simplification and generalisation of
B ayesian probabi l ity. Belief-functions concentrate on the evidence and also provide
for an upper and lower level of probability. A w ide margin between the upper and
lower levels expresses explicitly a state of ignorance. This is not possible in classical
probability where ignorance is typically represented by a probabil ity of 0.5. This
muddles the concept of ignorance with the actual probability of an event, which may
indeed be 0.5.

Naturally Dempster-Shafer theory continues to develop as more experience is gained
with its use. Yen cited by Avanzato points out that some of the problems with the
system have been conquered.

[YEN, 1 989] describes an expert system, GERTIS (General Evidential
Reasoning Tool for Intelligent Systems), which extends D-S theory to overcome
several of the problems ......this is accomplished in part by modifying Dempster's
Rule to combine belief updates instead of absolute belief measures.(Avanzato,
1 991 , p. 70)
A full description of Dempster's Rule of Combination is found in the next section.

SI

3.2.3. 1 The mechanics of Dempster-Sha/er
The Dcmpstcr-Slmfer theory is a generalisation of pmhahil ity theory with it!-> root!-> in a
theo1y of upper and lower probabil ities (Fung & Chong. 1 986>.
The main d ifference between Dempster-Shafer Evidential reasoning ( also called
Belief Calculus) and standard probabi lity theory is the relaxation of the constraint that
the probability of an event and the probability of i ts negation must sum to one.
ie P(X) + P(not X ) = I in probabil ity theory.
P(X) + P(not X) <= l in Dempster-Shafer.
The central concept i n this paradigm is that of the frame of discernment (F). Thi s is
similar to the sample space in probabi lity. The elements of F are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive and can be explai ned as the solutions to the question at hand
(Valverde & Gelh, 1 992). In the case of n possi ble outcomes there are 2 n possibilities.
these are all possible subsets of the frame of discernment.
The basic probability function m defines a probabi lity number for each subset of the
frame of discernment.
This function satisfies two basic properties
1 . m(0) = 0. The probability number of a null event is 0.
2. The sum of the probabilities of all the other subsets is t .
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cg. If there are 2 suspects of a crime. Bill and Jim then
m( Bill} == . I

Strength of cvidcm:e th.11 Bill is guilty

m(Jim) == . 2

Strength o f evidence that Jim is guilty

m( { Bill. Jim } ) = . 7 Strength of evidence that the culprit is in the subset

I Bill. Jim I
From the basic probability numbers. two other measures of a hypothesis can be
derived. belief ( Bel) and plausibility(Plaus). The belief interval for hypothesis(a ). is
then given by [ Bel(a). Plaus(a)] and the difference Plaus(a) - Bel(a) represents the
amount of uncertainty with respect to a ( Cortez-Rello and Golshani. 1990, p. 13 ).
Also since
Bel(a) <== Prob(a) <= Plaus(a)
the degree of belief and the degree of plausibility can be regarded as the lower and
upper bound on the probability.
The degree of belief in a hypothesis (A a subset of F) is the combined sum of the basic
probabilities of A and its proper subsets. m(A) is then a measure of belief assigned to
A but Bel(A) is assigned to A and its subsets. Those basic probabilities in subsets that
constitute Bel(A) are known as the focal elements of Bel (Valverde & Gehl. 1 992).
The belief of a subset, measures the total belief which includes the belief in supersets.
eg Bel(Bill) = m(Bill) + m( { Bill.Jim} ). So Bel(Bill) = .8
The plausibility of a subset is ( 1 - Bel(not A))
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e.g. Plaus( Bill) = I - 111(1101 J i m ) = .8
A frequent critisism of dassical probahilily theory is in the ca!'.e of lilllc evidence for
or against a hypothesis. the sum of lhc prohahil ilies mu!-.l still he one. Thi!-. is no! the
case using helicf functions where Bcl ( A ) + Bel( not A ) <= Bel(F) = I
The probabilities arc referred lO as Measures of Belief and are combined according lo
Dempster's rule of combination (Spillman. 1 989. p. 47-49 ). A composite belief
function may be generated from two or more bel ief functions defined over the same
Frame of Discernment. If Bel I and Bel 2 are two belief functions based on different
evidence and m I (A). m2 ( B ) and m(C) denote the ba-;ic probabilites for Bel I . Bel 2 and
Bel respectively then Dempsters rule of combination is defined as follows:

There are two perspectives of the Dempster-Shafer theory of Belief functions. The
compatibility view and the probability allocation view.
The compatibility view, interprets the theory of belief functions in terms of a
mapping or a compatibility relation between two different but related sets of
mutually exclusive propositions (Lingras & Wong, 1 990, p. 468).
These two sets respectively provide an upper and lower value and together they define
a belief interval. The Bayesian probability, which is considered to be the 'true' value
is estimated to be contained within this interval. The second view is the probability
allocation view.
Another view of the theory constructs belief functions based on a body of
evidence which is too vague to be described in terms of propositions. The
belief functions in the second view are constructed by allocating a certain
probability mass to not necessarily singleton sets of possible answers.
(Lingras & Wong, 1 990, p. 468)

54

3.2.3.2 Advantages of Dempster-Sha/er
Dempster-Shafer theory is seen as a generalisation nf prohahility theory (Fung &
Chong. 1986). It explicitly represents measurement of a degree of belief ( Valvcrc.lc &
Gehl. 1992). and :.11Jows for the explicit representation of ignorance ( Spillman.1989}.
A common problem with the representation of uncertainty is that of effectively
combining information from several sources (sec Section 2.5 Sources of Uncertainty).
Dempster-Shafer through its combining function explicitly provides a solution to this
situation (Cortes-Rello & Golshani. J 990).
Along with the advantages of course come some disadvantages.

3.2.3.3 Disadvantages of Dempster-Sha/er
A significant disadvantage of D-S theory is that the assumption of independence of
evidence is not always realistic ( Henkind & Harrison. 1988 ). This same disadvantage
applies to Certainty factors and the early Bayesian Techniques. Bayesian Belief
networks however, explicity express dependence by the arcs in the network.
Shafer, one of the creators of the theory points out that the combination rule is
pragmatically rather than mathematically based. He i ndicates that there is r.o
theoretical justification for the combination rule.
"there is no conclusive a priori argument for Dempster's rule ... the rule does
seem to reflect the pooling of evidence" ( Shafer, 1 976, p.57)

The belief interval is defined by the values Bel (The degree of belief) and Plaus (the
degree of plausibility). These values have been said to be estimates of t he true
probability (Lingras & Wong, 1990) but Neopolitan is not sure of their use.
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Bel and Plaus are nebulous entities. They are not probabilities of the event
of interest nor the lower and upper probabilities therefore what meaning
can we attach to them? (Neopolitan, 1992, p.73).
Zadeh in Giarratano and Riley illustrates a problem with Dempster-Shafer theory by
the use of an example that produces unanticipated results (Giarratano & Riley, 1994 ).
The example used is the belief by two doctors. A and B. in a patent's illness. The
beliefs in the patient's problem are:
IDA (meningitis)= 0.99
mA (brain tumor)= 0.01
m8 (concussion)= 0.99
mB (brain tumor) = 0.0 I

The Dempster rule of combination gives a combined belief of I in the brain tumour.
The problem arises in this instance because this is the only illness that is supported by
both doctors.
Dempster-Shafer has also been considered to be computationally complex (Lee, 1987).
There have been recent improvements to this by Xu and Kennes reported in their
paper, "Steps towards an Efficient Implementation of Dempster-Shafer Theory" (Xu &
Kennes, 1994).
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3.2.3.4 Support Logic Programming
Support Logic Programming (SLPl was developed hy J. Baldwin and co-worker'>
(Dubois and Prade. 1990). At first sight this is simply one of the multiplicity of other
techniques proposed for handling uncertainty. Careful consideration ho• "Ver reveals
that the support pair is very similar to the belief interval [Belief. Plausibility J of the
Dempster-Shafer Theory. Dubois and Prade( I 990.p2 l ) indicate that this model is in
accordance with the theory of evidence- at lea-;t mathematicalli It is unclear whether
Support Logic Programming is a proposed improvement to Dempster-Shafer theory
or simply an alternate form of implementation.
In SLP an uncertain statement is expressed as

where A is an atomic formula in first order logic.
Sn is the degree of necessary support for A
Sp is the degree of possible support for A.
The degree of possible support for A is interpreted as the fact that
I - Sp is the support for not A.
eg. (0,0) A is certainly false
(1,1) A is certainly true
( O, l) It is unknown if A is true or false.
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A voting model is considered when looking to comhine information. This solves the
problem of combining information from several sources (sec Section 2.5 Sourl'l'" of
Uncertainty). It is done by considering the information to he from a numhcr of
different expert sources. they each have a vote, and tl,c votes arc considered to have
equal influence. The proportion of the population voting yes to proposition A is
denoted p(A) . Baldwin extended the voting model to allow for don't know answers.

For two hypothesis A and B, information required is what proportion of voters support
(A and B). (not A and B), (not A and not B) and (A and not B). This clearly depends
on the voting behaviour of individuals and different combination rules are presented
for the three cases of Independence ( see Section 3.2.1.2.2 Independent Events).

I

j

Mutual Dependence and Mutual Exclusion.
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3.2.4 Possibility Theory (Fuzzy sets)
Fuzzy logic is one of the larger class of multi valued logil:s. They arc named multi
valued because they allow more values than the simple true and false of classical lcgic.
The difficulties of representing imprecise information in probability theory led to the
development of Possibility Theory. This is an extension, by Zadeh, of his theory of
Fuzzy Sets. Possibility Theory replaces the binary logic of probability with a multi
valued logic. Lea Sombe (Lea Sombe. 1990) suggests that the logic statement "all A's
are B's" should be expressed "the more one is A, the more one is B" in fuzzy logic.
Fuzzy logic is able to represent and reason with such terms as hot, dangerous, a lirrle
and .erymuch (Giarratano & Riley. 1994). Neopolitan (1992) explains that wherea-;
probability theory allows us to attach a measure of how uncertain we are of the truth or
falsity of a proposition, Fuzzy set theory "deals with propositions that have vague
meaning" (Neopolitan, 1992, p. 74). When a doctor says that an operation has a 90%
chance of improving a patient's condition by 50%. then the 90% represents a
probability while the 50% represents fuzzy set membership.
Shenoy has proposed a framework of VBS (Valuation Based Systems) for managing
uncertainty in expert systems (Shenoy, I 992a). This framework is general enough to
include many of the possible paradigms for managing uncertainty that have been
proposed. In another article "Using possibility theory in expert systems", Shenoy
shows how possibility theory can be fitted into the framework of VBS. In possibility
theory the "basic representational unit is called the possibility function" (Shenoy,

1992). Projection and particularization are the main operations for manipulating
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possibili1y functions. Dubois and Pradc cited in Shcnoy (Shcnoy. 1992J pointed out the
correspondence between projection and marginalisation. an operation in VBS that
corresponds to the coarsening of knowledge: and the corrcspondenc.:c hctwccn
particularisation and combination. the VBS operations that is used for the aggregation
of knowledge.
It has been argued that probability theory is all that is required to deal with unccnainty
(Cheeseman. 1986) and therefore Fuzzy sets must simply be expressing a form of
probability theory. However this example demonstrates that fuzzy set theory is able to
express concepts not applicable to probability theory (a similar example appears in
(Neopolitan, 1990)). Consider a cross bred animal, for example a sheep that has a pure
bred Marino and a pure bred Dorset for its parents. It is neither a Marino nor a Dorset
but has 50% membership in both sets. there is no probability involved.
It has been suggested that there are two ways of using fuzziness in expen systems:
One method is to provide fuzzy truth values to rules and conditions in their
premises, ..... The second approach is to handle uncertainty and imprecision with
linguistic quantifiers and the use of fuzzy terms in the condition. eg. If the water
level of the river is high and the water level of the river is rapidly rising then
prepare to open the gates to the bypass canal. (Chang & Hall, 1992, p.598)
The second approach may be referred to a'> linguistic logic (Novak.1992). It is
however always based on the first approach.
Miyoshi et al. ( Miyoshi et al., 1992) have developed an expen system shell that
incorporates two different kinds of uncertainty both based on fuzzy logic, a fuzzy
production system and a fuzzy frame system. They report that they are working on
expert systems in the fields of foreign exchange and image recognition.
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3.2.4. l Tlie meclia11ics of Fuzzy sets
In (normul) set theory. membership of a set is a hoolcan value. that i.., either true( I) or
false(O). A clwracteristicjimctirm is the cstahlished way of showing which ohjccts arc
members of a set (Giarratano & Riley. 1994).
if x is an clement of set A
0

if x is not an element of set A

An alternate definition is in terms of af1111crio11al mappin,:.
UA(X): X->{0.l}

A Fuzzy set may be represented by a generalisation of the characteristic function that
is called the membershipf1mctio11 (Giarratano & Riley. 1994).
UA(X): x -> [0,1]

Although on the surface these two definitions appear very similar. the membership
function is a real number between O and I that represents the grade of membership of
the fuzzy set.
So in contrast to the crisp sets of standard set theory, Fuzzy set theory allows grades of
membership. Imprecise terms such as "short man" can be represented by a Fuzzy set
which has a value of 1 (conclusively is a member of the set of short men) for a height
of 150cm and a value of O (definitely not in the set of short men) for a height of 180cm
and is smooth and monotonic between these values (see Figure 3.2 An Example of a
Fuzzy membership function, on the next page)..
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Membership of Fuzzy set - Short man
Q.

i

1

0.8
O
i
0.6
,8
ftl .c 0.4
0.2

o �I

0-+--�������+-�������-+-������_....
150

160

170

180

Height

Figure 3.2 An example of a Fuzzy membership function
Fuzzy sets can be combined using the operations of intersection and union. The
intersection operation is carried out by taking the minimum value of the two
membership functions.
m(short and fat)= MIN(m(short), m(fat))
Whilst the union of two fuzzy sets is found by taking the maximum values.
m(short or fat)= MAX{m(short), m(fat))
The fuzzy set membership function can also be altered by the use of other linguistic
terms. In Table 3.1 (on the next page), m is a modifier, Fis the modified membership
function (Lee, Grize and Dehnad, 1987, p. 29), the descriptions are from a d = fferent
source (Giarratano & Riley, 1994).
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m

F

Description

Not

l - f(x)

Negation

Very

f � (X)

lntcnsi fication

More

t :;(X)

i

Dilation

or Less
Table 3.1 Fuzzy Qualifiers

3.2.4.2 Approximate Reasoning
Approximate Reasoning \� ;:.<= proposed by Zadeh as a mathematical method to model
human reasoning wi!ih "vague m,ttions present" (Novak. 1992).

It

contains two kinds of

rules, Translation an,1d Inference. irhe former are used to obtain fuzzy sets from natural
language, the latter are i0 obt:1i,lt conclusions from premises, that is to carry out the
reasoning process.
Fuzzy "if-then" rules have the form:
If Xis Cj then Y is Sj
where Ci and Sj are fuzzy sets over X and Y respectively. eg. If the road is quite wet
then drive slowly. (Koczy & Hirota, 1992)
In their paper "A fast algorithm for Fuzzy Inference", Koczy and Hirota state that
there have been various methods used for the Inference process over a knowledge base
that c:ontains fuzzy rules. They investigate two methods, "probably those two which
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arc applied mosl frcyucntly" and discover thal one algorilhm ha" a weak sensitivily in
reasoning and has low compulational complex ity whibt the other ha" good reasoning
but is complex computationally. They go on lo suggest a "fast and sensiti ve" algorithm
that itself contains some other minor prohlcms { Km:zy & Hirota, 1 992 ).

3.2.4.3 A critique of Fuuy sets
The main limilations of probability theory is that it is based on two valued logic. An
event either occurs or it does not. Another limitation is that probabilities are real
numbers. Important issues which Zadeh ( Zadeh. 1 985. p. 4) says can be dealt with by
fuzzy logic and not probability are
1.

The fuzziness of antecedents or consequents

2.

Partial match between the antecedents of a rule and a fact supplied by the user.
through the compositional rule of inference and interpolation.

3.

The presence of fuzzy quantifiers in the antecedent and/or the consequent
Fuzzy logic has been shown to be a successful representation for uncertainty in
expert system design, some difficulties have been identified .... elements of fuzzy
set theory ignore some mutual exclusivity requirements and that some
distributions and qualifier operations (eg. squaring for 'Very') are subjective in
nature and may exhibit inaccuracies[Ng, Abramson, 1 990J. (Avanzato, 1 990,
p.71 )

Graham ( 1 99 1 ) in his paper "Fuzzy logic in commercial expert systems" considers a
number of expert systems and plant and machinery controllers that use fuzzy logic. He
cites numerous examples mainly from the U.S.A. and Japan, many of which were, at
the time of writing, in experimental form. Graham considered one of the most
impressive applications of fuzzy logic to be the automatic train operations system
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developed by Hitachi for the Sendai municipal suhway sy-.tcm. The -.ystcrn optimi:.cs
fuel consumption and other aspects of system pcrfonnam.:c through the use of fuzzy
rules. such as "if the speed is far he/ow the limi1 thcn the power notch is selected"
(Grahan, 1 99 1 ).
Shiraishi ( 1 989) suggest that fuzzy reasoning was useful in the development of an
expert system for damage assessment.
1.

By introducing the fuzzy set manipulation system into the expert system, it
is possible to utilize the knowledge and rules which are expressed in terms
of natural language.

2.

Based on fuzzy reasoning, it is possible to reduce the number of rules
necessary for deriving a meaningful conclusion. The reduction is very useful
for building a practical expert system (Shiraishi , et al., 1 989, p. 21 6).

It has been shown that as well as being appl icable to rule-ba<ied expert systems. Fuzzy
sets may also be applied to connectionist expert systems that is. those based on Neura,
networks (Cohen & Hudson, 1 992).

Some have claimed to have demonstrated that fuzzy logic has been incorrectly used in
problems that are examples of uncertain inference {Cheeseman, 1 986). Further claims
have been made that fuzzy set theory can be subsumed by Bayesian probabi lity.
Others disagree and maintain that fuzzy set theory addresses a "fundamentally
different class of problems from that of probability theory". This section concludes
with a very useful example that aims to demonstrate this difference (Neopolitan, 1 992,

p.77).
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Suppose we have the constraints:
C 1 = "X should be close to 4"
C2 =

··x should be close to 6"

and the goals
G1 =

··x should be close to 5"

G2 = "X should be close to 3"
If we are restricted to the set of integers, these constraints and goals can be
we
represented by the fuzzy sets in Table 3.2 If we take
obtain the fuzzy set D this is our dP.cision. Since no X has full membership in D ,
we can define our optimal decision as being X that maximizes D. I n this case that
is X equal to 5. This problem has nnthing to do with uncertainty. it is preferably
called approximate. (Neapolitan, H,G2, p.78)
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Table 3.2 The fuzzy set membership in Gt, G2, Cl, C2 and D
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3.3 Symbolic approaches
Symbolic approaches lo handling uncertainly arc also referred to as 1w11-1wmeric or
qualitati\'e methods (Graham. 1 99 1 ). In addition the Lenn plausihle rea.rn11i11}!. is often
used. It has been defined as "reasoning ihat leads to uncertain conclusions because ib
methods arc fallible or its premises arc uncertain" ( Shafer&Pearl. 1 990). Plausible
reasoning has not developed a typical language because formalisations have been
absorbed by probability theory. (This lack of typical language has caused difficulty
when researching this topic for this thesis.)

Symbolic treatments of uncertainty are seen to have advantages and disadvantages in
relation to numeric methods. Symbolic methods generally have "strong explanation
capabil ities" but that their fragility is in the combining of evidence (Avanzato. 1 99 L
p. 7 1 ). This can be clearly seen in the ability of the theory of endorsements to provide
its reasons for believing (or disbelieving) in an hypothesis (see Section 3.3. l Theory
of Endorsements).

Symbolic representations are also more suitable to handle uncertainty of particular
types. The ability to reason with incomplete information has been identified as a
strength but researchers have suggested that symbolic methods are unable to cope with
imprecise information, "since they lack any measure to quantify confidence levels"
(Bonissone & Decker, 1 986, p. 2 1 8).

Other researchers use different terminology. Methods for handling uncertainty have
been categorised as either quantitative or qualitative approaches (Graham, 1 99 1 ). The
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qualitative methods arc said to vary from 1hose that hide uncertainty in lingui.,tic:
terms to those that provide intricate methods u... ing nonmonotonic logil' or
endorsements.
Sullivan and Cohen { l 990 ) argue against the use of numbers to represent uncertainty.
Their argument has been summarised to the following points
1 . Subjective degrees of belief do not behave as probabilities
2. Experts are uncomfortable in committing themselves to numbers
3. I n some situations the accuracy has little effect on performance
4. Numbers tell us how much to believe, not why to believe (Sullivan &
Cohen. 1 990).
The theory of endorsements provides an answer to the concerns about the use �f
numbers to represent uncertainty by providing a clear alternati ve. Although. a� will be
explained in the next section numerical rnea�ures are not eliminated completely.

3.3.1 Theory of Endorsements
The main principle behind this uncertainty management system is to avoid the use of
numbers to represent uncertainty. Cohen believes that where numbers are used to
represent imprecise information, that they act as a summary of several different
aspects of uncertainty, (see Section 2.5. Sources of Uncertainty above) and therefore
infonnation is lost.
The Theory of Endorsements explicitly records the reasons for believing or
disbelieving a proposition. This method would appear to be closer to the actual
method of reasoning used by human experts, who would simply endorse their belief in
a statement by a list of reasons. Clark indicated that endorsements may be divided
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into five classes: rules, data. task. conclusion and resolution endorscm::nls, however
no detail on how the types comp,trc is included ( Clark, 1 990).
Bonissone suggests that there arc possihlc problems in the combinatorial explosion of
information required.
a set of rules is needed to propagate endorsements over inferences
.. combination of endorsements in a premise, propagation of endorsements
to a conclusion, and ranking of endorsements must be explicitly specified
for each particular context (Bonissone, 1 987, p. 859)

Although the process of endorsement is similar to the recording of justifications in
truth maintenance systems (TMS). there is an important difference (de Kleer. 1984)
(Cohen and Grinberg, 1988). TMS are discussed briefly in section 3 .4.2. In the TMS
the kind of support for a justification is i rrelevant. However. endorsements consider
the aspects of inferences that are relevant to reasoning about their certainty.
Endorsements can be ranked. The user would have more confidence in an hypothesis
with a higher ranked endorsement.
Clark suggests that the motivation for Cohen's Theory of Endorsements is the
realisation that the composition of reasons to believe or disbelieve produce the level of
certainty. (Clark, 1 990).
The Theory of Endorsements developed by Cohen has been implemented in the
Expert System shell appropriately named Solomon. The system is working in an ES
to advise on portfolio investments (Bhatnager and Kanal, 1 986, p. 14) and provides a
natural approach to uncertainty although it still has difficulties to be overcome.
Bhatnager and Kanai ( 1 986, p. 1 5) explain ,that
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When Solomon derives inferences using rules, all the endorsements carried
by the antecedents are transferred to the consequent. The endorsements of
the rule, the tasks, the data and the conclusion are all included in the
endorsement of the consequent. Since such conclusions are used to prove
other tasks. SOLOMON builds up huge bodies of endorsements for
conclusions only after a few inferences.

There are still limitations to the theory of endorsements. Although c ombining
evidence and ranking propositions are important in controlJing inference, these
operations are not readily available when using the theory of endorsements. A limi ted
ranking of endorsements would be reasonable to consider when usi ng combination
rules but given a large number of endorsements it is not clear how combination could
be performed. Cohen has not provided an answer to the question, "How do experts
combine evidence?"
Cohen has pointed out that : "The model of endorsements does not preclude
endorsements that i nclude numerical measures such 'lS degrees of belief' ( Cohen.
1 985. p. 53).
Grech and Sammut describe an expert system shell that was used to i mplement a
system for the i dentification of radar emitters (Grech & Sammut. 1989). They suggest
that the shell was developed for dynamic domains in which "the use of probabili ti es is
highly questionable". As a result the shell uses a combination of an assumption-based
truth maintenance system and a system of endorsements to enable it to reason under
uncertainty. One of the features of the system which i s important i s that i t "enables
problem solving to occur incrementally as new information concerni ng the state of the
world is acquired" (Grech and Sammut, I 989, p. 308).
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3.3.2 Non-monotonic logics
There arc thre<: bn)ad categories of Non-monotonic reason ing ( Boni..,sone, Cyrluk,
Goodwin and Stillman, 1 990)
I . consistency - such as McDermott and Doyle's non- monotonic logic and Reiter\
default logic.
2. minimization - circumscription, McCarthy( 1 980).

3 . epistemology - autoepistemic logic. Moore( 1 98 3 J.
According to Cohen ( 1 985) non-monotonic reasoning was first applied by Stal lman
and Sussman in 1 977 in a system for electronic circuit analysis. Reiter (Reiter, J 987 l
describes non-monotonic reasoning as a "particular kind of plausible reasoning". He
explains that most examples of such reasoning are of the kind: "Normally. A Holds. ··
This type of reasoning then is different to the predicate logics. Lea Sombe ( 1 990)
suggests that the logic statement "all the A's are B ' s" should be expre<;sed "an A is a
B, up to exceptions" in Reiter' s default logic.
Traditional mathematic logic does not provide for reasoning with incomplete
information as it is inherently monotonic . ..,..his means that whenever we have a
relationship between a set of sentences (S) and a conclusion (c) such as S implies c
then i ncluding new sentences in the antecedent will not change the conclusion. Reiter
sums this up as "new i nformation, preserves old conclusions." ( Reiter. 1 987).
As an example of default reasoning, suppose we know of a bird called Pengui and
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wish to know whether it is capable of flight. A non monotonic logic hold� the
following rules:
I . " if x is a bird and failing any evidence to the contrary then assume x can fly"
"if x is a penguin then x cannot fly"
3. "if x is an ostrich then x cannot fly"
If our knowledge of Pengui is incomplete but we know that she is a bird then we must
assume from l that she can fly. If we later discover that Pengui is in fact a penguin
then we must revise our assumption. It is quite clear that classical logic is inadequate
to represent this type of logical mechanism because here adding information has
changed the original conclusion.
Bonissone and co-workers ( 1990) suggest that non-monotonic logic allows a more
natural form of reasoning, it mirrors more closely the manner that most people reason
.. we are constantly making assumptions about the world and revising those
assumptions as we obtain more information. Informally the common idea of
non-monotonies is that we may want to be able to jump to conclusions.
which might have to be retracted as new information about the world
becomes available.
(Bonissone, Cyrluk, Goodwin & Stillman, 1 990, p. 69)

Non-monotonic logic does not manage without the use of numerical measures of
uncertainty by magically transforming uncertainty to certainty. McDermott and Doyle
( 1 980) explain
the purpose of non-montonic inference rules is not to add certainty where
there is none, but rather to guide the selection of tentatively held beliefs in
the hope that fruitful investigations and good guesses will result. This
means that one should not a priori expect non monotonic rules to derive
valid conclusions independent of the non-monotonic rules. Rather one
should expect to be led to a set of beliefs which, while perhaps ev1:mtually
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shown incorrect, will meantime coherently guide im1estigations. (McDermott

& Doyle, 1 980. p. 42)

So non-monotonk logics arc useful in situations that arc uncertain hccausc of 1hc Jack
nf ( incomplete) information hut arc 1101 ahlc to deal with prohahilistic or fuzzy
reasoning. Rcscurchers have criticised non-monotonies for this inadequacy
( Bonissone. 1 987). Others however have elaborated on this aspect of defau lt reasoni ng
and demonstrated that non-monotonies perform a different type of reasoning under
uncertainty and are therefore not in competition with the other methods of reasoning
under uncertainty (Clark, 1 990).
At any point in time, propositions are considered to be true or false, but no

degrees of credibility are permitted. So using a nonmonotonic logic it is not
possible to deal comprehensively with partial information about an event.
(Clark, 1 990, p. 1 29)
Nonmonotonics were developed to deal with uncertainty resulting from i ncomplete
not partial information.
Reiter ( 1 987) suggests that there are two basic approac hes to diagnostic reasoning.
The experimental approach is dominant and uses rules of thumb, stat istical intuition
and past experiences of human experts.
The second approach diagnosis from structure and behaviours, the only
information at hand, is a description of some system together with an
observation of that system's behaviour. If this observation conflicts with
intended system behaviour then the diagnostic problem is to determine
which components could by malfunctioning account for the discrepancy
between observed and correct system behaviour. Since components can
fail in various and often unpredictable ways, their normal or default
behaviours should be described. These descriptions fit the pattern of
plausible reasoning. (Reiter, 1 987, p.638)
It has been noted that several distinct versions of Reiters default logic (DL) were
suggested between 1 98 8 and I 99 1 . The main work published by Rei ter on this topic
was in 1 980 (Reiter, 1 980). This work is all entirely theoretical and appears not yet
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to haw been applied to expert system development so it will not he further
investigated here (Giordano & Martelli. 1 994 J.
Marvin Cohen sums up non-monotonic logk as a "computationally efficient method
for reasoning with incomplete informat ion" (Cohen, 1 985 ). He also suggests that the
features of non-monotonic reasoning make it particularly suitable for 'meta
reason ing'. that is the process of controlling the application of the uncertainty calculus.
This idea will be revisited in Chapter 5.
The method of Reasoned Assumptions is another form of non-monotonic logic.
Uncertainty embedded in an impl ication is removed by listing all the e xceptions to
that rule. Like other non-monotonies Assumption-based systems can cope with the
case of incomplete in formation, but they are inadequate to handle the case of
imprecise information with rea<;oned assumptions ( Bonissone, 1 987).
It has been suggested that the essential difference between numeric and non-numeric
approaches to uncertainty is that in numeric approaches each piece of evidence may be
believed to only a partial extent whilst the reasoning may have a "high degree of
confidence". This can be contrasted with non-numeric approaches where each piece of
evidence is completely believed or disbelieved and confidence in the reasoning is
based on the underlying assumptions (Bhatnagar & Kanal. 1 986).
So in non-monotonic reasoning before inferencing can be performed assumptions
have to be made (or defaults assigned). The results obtained may be l ater revised in
the light of new evidence.
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3.4 Hybrid approaches
Hybrid approaches to the handling of uncertainty use aspects of both nu meric and
symbolic reasoning. The aim is to take advantage of both methods of reasoning, and lO
combine these advantages into a single method of reasoning.

3.4.1 The Non-Monotonic Probabilist
Cohen ( 1 985) developed the Non-Monotonic Probabilist ( NMP), a hybrid approach
to uncertainty. spec ifically for the field of i mage analysis. A domain that he describes
as requiring an "explicit and valid quantitative model of uncertainty". and "a
metastructure of qual itative reasoning", in which the conjectures of the model are
reconsidered i n the reasoning process. This method was i ntroduced by considering
the handling of confl ict resolution in numeric and non-numeric paradi gms. It is
suggested that Bayesian methods ( and all other numeric methods) actually expect
d ivergence occasionally and because of this. the l ine of rea-;oning is similar to t hat
where extreme meac;urements are expected to "cancel each other out ". This
perspective is quite different to the qualitative viewpoint where contrary evidence can
only occur as a result of flawed knowledge, thus the response is to identify the
mistake(s) in the argument and correct it (them). Cohen explains
Pure probabilistic systems never learn anything new about their probabilistic
beliefs and assumptions from the experience of applying them. Pure non
monotonic systems do learn, but they have an arbitrariness and an all-or
none quality about the new beliefs they acquire. Our argument, quite simply,
is that both capabilities are needed, and that satisfactory systems will, in
general require their combination" (Cohen, 1 985, p. 3. 1 8).

NMP is an ex.pert system building tool that incorporates hybrid methods for reasoning
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under uncertainty. It uses Shafcrian belief rather than Bayc.... ian probability bccaw,c of
the possibility for the ex plicit representation of ignorance {Cohen, 1 985 ).

3.4.2 Truth Maintenance Systems
Truth M ..1intemmce Systcms(TMS) are identified by de Klecr as having the problem of
only considering one solution at a time (de KJeer. 1984 ). However Assumption-Based
Truth Maintenance Systems (ATMS) allow "arbitrarily many contradictory solutions
to coexist" (de Kleer. I 984. p. 81 ). D'Ambrosio discusses an hybrid approach to
reasoning under uncertainty using ATMS:
"the method relies on the propagation mechanisms in an ATMS to perform
most evidence combination operations symbolically, and only substitutes
numeric values when asked for the certainty of a proposition" (D'Ambrosia,
1 989, p. 268).

Advantages of this technique include improved handling of dependent and partially
independent evidence, rapid re-evaluation of propositional certainty values with
different sets of assumption certainties, and the ability to obtain certainty values for a
variety of different perspectives {partial solutions) with little computational effort
(D'Ambrosia, 1989, p. 282).
Filman adds further weight to the argument, that this type of assumption-based
reasoning is more similar to most human reasoning, than that of traditional logic.
In general, reasoning is the process of deriving new knowledge from old. If
the underlying knowledge never changes, if we never explore hypothetical
spaces, and if our knowledge is free of internal contradictions, the
accumulation of knowledge is straight forward: We just add the results of
our reasoning to our pile of knowledge. Unfortunately, few problems are so
simple. We usually find ourselves reasoning under a set of assumptions
that may be withdrawn or changed. Often the entire reasoning process is
focused on identifying preferred assumption sets. Ideally when the
assumptions change we would like tc withdraw those conclusions that are
no longer valid, retaining those that a1 � stil l true. This requires attaching to
derived facts justifications or dependencies, that is, reasons for belief in
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these facts (Filman, 1 988, p.384).
So with this method of reasoning we may concentrate on the assumptions that drive
the process of reasoning. Doyle· s system uses the concept that certain assumptions arc
either believed or not believed. "A particular derivation would be valid, for example.
i f assumptions X and Y were in, but Z out" ( Filman, 1 988, p.384).

Assumption based Truth Maintenance Systems then provide for many contradictory
solutions to be held and a natural way of reasoning.
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Chapter 4: A comparison of uncertainty
management techniques
4. 1 Chapter overview
This chapter will attempt to compare uncertainty management techniques. The chapter
is in four parts. The first introduces the concept of comparison and contains a warning
for the expert system developer. The second part of the chapter considers three
methods that have been suggested in the literature to perform the comparison. Each
suggests features that are important in the comparison. The first ( Wise & Henrion.
1986) considers the results of the expert system to be of paramount importance. The
second (Cohen, 1 985) is in effect a cost benefit analysis that suggests it is important to
weigh up the Validi ty (Benefits} and Feasibility (Costs). The third method of
comparison (Bonissone, 1987) is in the form a Desiderata for uncertainty management
techniques. Each UMT is classi fied on whether or not it meets each of thirteen
objectives.
The third part of the chapter considers comparisons of UMTs that have been reported
in the literature. This section is dominated by numeric UMT' s with little on Non
numeric and barely a mention of hybrid methods reflecting the amount of material
available. Hybrid methods especially are in their infancy and therefore are rarely
mentioned beyond the hope that they may provide for a better method for the future.
The complexity of such implementation is a limiting factor for the present.
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Finally the chapter considers some of the recent advances in the theory of reasoning
under uncertainty.

4.2 An introduction to comparison and warning
Ginsberg advised that comparing Uncertainty Management Techniques was in the too
hard basket. "The true advantages of the various competing paradigms will onl y be
apparent when these paradigms have been incoq1orated in ful l-scale systems"
(Ginsberg, 1986). Even then, a method of performing the comparison, or a scale
along which the performance of the UMT's is to be measured may be difficult or
inappropriate to find.
There appears to be a trend in the literature that identifies a shift in belief over the
years from the mid-eighties to the early nineties. The start of the period is
characterised by claims that certain UMT's are the one and onl y correct system: eg.
Cheeseman (Cheeseman. 1986) argued in favour of probability and Zadeh (Zadeh.
1986) in favour of fuzzy set theory.
The following quote from Shafer was ahead of its time and is far more characteristic
of the early n ineties.
I believe that in the next few years both Bayesian and belief-function
designs will find their niches in the world of expert systems. Bayesian
designs will predominate in systems that are repeatedly applied under
conditions so constant that the picture of answers determined at random
with known chances fits. Belief-function designs will be more successful in
systems whose each use represents a relatively unusual conjunction of
different small worlds of experience (Shafer, 1 986, p. 1 35).
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4.2. 1 Warning to the expert system developer, your UMT
may not be what it claims
Magill and Leech ( 1 99 1 ) investigated two commercially avail ahlc expert system tools
that used respectively, Bayes' Theorem and Certainty Factors, for the handling of
uncertainty. Their aim was to recommend the more appropriate tool for a particular
task.
They discovered that the complex decision of which UMT was more appropriate for
an individual ES development was further hampered by the fact t hat "the two specific
tools do not follow strictly the theories on which they are based".
This matter is beyond the scope of this investigation since it was never intended to
investigate particular i mplementations. It is included here as merely a warning to
expert system developers that it is possible that the methodology selected may not be
implemented in its purest form.
Returning to the comparison of U MTs, is this a matter of comparison of apples with
oranges? If so. then when should the apple be selected for a particular application
ahead of the orange.
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4.3 Methods for comparing UMT's
Before beginning to compare UMTs. the manner in which they arc to he compared
should be considered. This section will consider three methods of comparison that
have been suggested. The first suggests accuracy of results (Wisc & Hcnrion, 1 986),
the second suggests a framework of features for comparison - it is in essence a cost
benefit analysis (Cohen, 1 985). and the third is a Desiderata - a list of requirements
(Bonissone. 1 987 ).

4.3.1 Comparison using results produced
Wise and Henrion in 1 986 felt that it was important to test Uncertain Inference
systems ( UISs. usually elsewhere in this paper referred to as paradigms of reasoning
under uncertainty or UMTs) in respect of the results they produced whilst
acknowledging that other aspects were important.
The main purpose of this paper is to present and try to justify a framework
for testing the accuracy of UIS's results, ignoring for the moment issues of
computational effort, clarity, or simplicity. . .. we believe that clearer
presentation of these fundamentals and examination of the methods against
the full range of criteria, including the theoretical, pragmatic issues, as well
as the experimental comparison of performance explored here, could shed
some needed light. (Wise & Henrion, 1986, p.82)
Despite the drawbacks of this method of comparison the1 consider that information
regarding the accuracy of outcomes from the expert system will a,;sist the expert
system developer in making a selection.
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Different people will have different weightings for these criteria, reflecting
their different goals, and so it may never be appropriate to attempt definitive
evaluation of the techniques. But in any case. better analytic and
experimental evidence which compares the performance of UIS's in terms
of their results, should help to provide system designers a more solid basis
for choosing among them (Wise & Henrion , 1 986, p.82).

It is trnc that the system designer docs need to know that a certain UMT provides
reasonable results. but it is not likely that this is to be the overriding selection criterion
on every occasion. Accuracy of result is only one of se veral possible criteria for the
selection of a paradigm. Other criteria. including the feasibility of implementing a
particular paradigm are considered by the framework suggested by Marvin Cohen and
outlined in the following section (Cohen. 1 985 ).

4.3.2 A framework for evaluating paradigms
A framework for evaluating theories of uncertainty is presented by Marvin Cohen
(Cohen, 1 985, p. 2-4 ). He suggests t hat the framework:
•

provides an opportunity to clarify our comprehension of the task.

•

suggests ways i n which models may be changed.

•

possibly provides the structure on which to build new in ference methods.
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Overall Value
Validity
(Benefits)
mantics

�eos1b1hly
(Costs)

Inference

Quor,t1ty

r--���-'--�--.

of Input

Computational
Trac tability

------------·· ------ -------------FIGURE 4. 1 : A Framework for Evaluating Theories of Uncertainty

This framework is illustrated i n Figure 4 . 1 . It provides for a number of features of the
various paradigms to be evaluated without speci fying which of the features is the most
import ant. This will depend on the speci fic development being undertaken, especial ly
the importance of the overal l system and the available budget. A developer of a low
budget system may not have the luxury of selecting val idity as their most important
criterion . They may make a different decision because of time constraints or l imited
equipment and be unable to consider more complex methods.
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4.3.3 The requirements of a theory of uncertainty
management
Bonissone ( 1 987) presents a Desiderata for Uncertainty management techniques in a
paper entitled Plausible reasoning. This consists of a set of thirteen objecti ves for an
UMT. It concentrates on the theoretical aspects rather than the practical , twelve of the
thirteen objectives are related to the validity rather than the feasibility of the UMT.
Nine UMT's are evaluated i n resper:t of whether or not they meet these objectives.
Each of these objectives will be discussed in tum. Bonissone ' s results are presented in
Table 4. l .
1 . Combination rules should not be based on global assumptions of
evidence independence.

Certainty factors are said to have this independence assumption. Heckerman ( 1 986)
objected to Certainty factors on the grounds that they did not allow explicit
representation of dependence or independence. The early Bayesian methods also made
this assumption.
2. The combination rules should not assume the exhaustiveness and
exclusiveness of the hypotheses.

Given this assumption there could quite clearly be inaccuracies in a system that had
not included all possible hypotheses if it were using probabilities of a variation. Since
all probability is relative to a sample space (Freund, 1 972).
3. There should be an explicit representation of the amount of evidence for
and against each hypothesis.

Since it is "the amount of evidence" that is to be represented, then a numeric
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representation would oc appropriate but c annot be combined into a �inglc figure.
4. There should be an explicit representation of the reasons for and against
each hypothesis.

Cohen's Theory of Endorsements provides the most explicit representation of the
reasons to support of an hypothesis or not. This is one of Cohen's major arguments
against numeric methods -- that they mask the reasons by simply combining them
into a nun . Jer.
5. The representation should allow the user to decide the uncertainty of any
information at the available level of detail (i.e. allowing heterogeneous
information granularity).

It would appear pointless to insist that the user provide n umbers ( uncertainty levels)
that are not known. These must be only guess-timates. It would be better to allow
information that is actually known even if less detail is therefore provided. This is the
sole objectives to consider the feasibility of the system, specifically the quantity of
input (see Figure 4. 1 : A Framework for Evaluating Theories of U ncertainty).
6. There should be explicit representation of consistency.
7. There should be an explicit representation of ignorance to allow
noncomm ittal statements.

Proponen ts of Dempster-Shafer (that includes an upper and lower limit to allow for
representation o f ignorance) argue that this is one of the major limitations of
probability theory.
8. There should be a clear distinction between a conflict in the information
(violation of consistency) and ignorance about the information.
9. There should be a second order measure of uncertainty recording the
uncertainty of the information as well as the uncertainty of the measure
itself.
10. The representation must be, or appear to be, natural to the user to
facilitate graceful interaction, natural to the expert to permit, elicitation of
consistent weights or reasons. and the semantics of procedures for
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propagating and summarising information must be clear.

Graham (Graham. 1 99 1 ) suggests that si nce it is true that people arc gcncrnl ly very
had at estimating probabilities then the Bayesian approach is not suitable for systems
to be used by non-statisticians.
1 1 . The syntax and semantics of the representation should be closed under
the rules of combination.
1 2. Making pairwise comparisons of uncertainty should be feasible as these
are required for decision making.

In general this type of comparison is possible with numeric values, but not symbolic.
Proponents of symbolic methods argue that this comparison may be invalid.
1 3. The traceability of the aggregation and propagation of uncertainty
through the reasoning process must be available to resolve conflicts of
contradictions, to explain the support of conclusions, and to perform
meta-reasoning for control.

This support for the reasoning process is available with symbolic methods and not
with numeric methods.
W it h the final two requirements of his Desiderata, Bonissone has dismissed. in
general, all numeric and symbolic methods. This leaves only the hybrid methods as
options to be further considered when looking for a method of uncertainty
representation t hat passes all his stipulations.
Table 4. 1 of the next page summarizes how Bonissone sees various UMTs in relation
to his Desiderata. He considers seven numeric and two non-numeric systems
(Reasoned assumptions and The Theory of Endorsements).
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Table 4. 1 Bonissone• s view of Uncertainty Representations
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4.4 Comparisons reported in the literature
In this section t he thesis will consider comparisons that have been made between
various ll MTs. There are three major sections here, reflecting firstly the overall
comparison between numeric and non-numeric methods in general. then two more
specific sections dealing with each of those in turn. The number of comparisons of
numeric methods found in the literature far outweighs that of the non-numeric
methods. This reflects the quantity of research in each area at this point in time.

4.4.1 Numeric versus non-numeric
Bonissone and colleagues argue in favour of the use of a numerical representation of
uncertainty on the grounds that this provides a method that can be used in the
inference engine.
With numerical representations, it is possible to define a calculus that
provides a mechanism for propagating uncertainty throughout the reasoning
process. The use of aggregation operators provides summaries which can
then be ranked to perform rational decisions. (Bonissone, Cyrluk, Goodwin
& Stillman, 1 990, p. 69}

They continue to suggest that models based on qualitative approaches are usually
designed to handle the aspect of uncertainty derived from the incompleteness of the
information. Doyle' s method of Reasoned Assumptions (Doyle, 1983) and Reiter's
Default reasoning (Reiter, 1 980) are examples of these. With a few exceptions they
are generally inadequate to handle the case of imprecise information, as they lack any
measure to quantify confidence levels.
Graham (Graham, 1991) suggests that since it is true that people are generally very
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bad at est imating probabilities then the Bayesian approach is not suitable for systems
to be used by non-statisticians.
However Bonissone in an earlier paper ( Bonissonc, 1 987) had argued that numerical
approaches to uncertainty required precision that an expert could simply not provide.
He considered that the complex calculations may not he justified given the di fficulty
of obtaining accurate initial figures.
it is clear that these models of uncertainty require an unrealistic level of
precision that does not actually represent a real assessment of uncertainty.
(Bonissone, 1 987, p. 73)

One of the very interesting expert systems of recent times is Cyc. This enormous
system is designed to capture common sense. Lenat and Guha ( 1 990) published a
"snapshot of research in progress" at the half way poin t in the ten year project.
Certainty factors were i nitially used in the project but were not popular with the
authors. They criticised CFs because of the "problem" that all numbers could be
compared. This meant that unreasonable comparisons coul d be made between very
similar CFs, numbers that really should not be compared. The Cyc project abandoned
CFs i n favour of a system having only five possible values. absolutely certain,
currently believed true (but capable of being overridden). unknown. currently believed
false (but capable of being overridden) and absolutely impossible. Lenat and Guha
suggest that this method works well when there "isn ' t too much semantic knowledge"
and fail s generally when some knowledge is missing {Lenat & Guha, l 990, p. 307).
Since no other detail of Cyc' s uncertainty handling has been located, this method is
not included in the section on symbolic approaches (Section 3.3 Symbolic
approaches).
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Henkind and Harrison surveyed four numeric UMT� and concluded that although
each had its strong points they saw the common uisadvantagc that they "compute
aggregate numbers but keep no record of divergent opinion" (Henkind & Harrison,
1 988, p.7 13).
Bonissone suggests that non-numeric U MTs have deficiencies in their ability to
"represent and summarize" measures of uncertainty (Bonissone, 1987, p. 860). Yet he
also points to restrictions in some of the numeric representations of uncertainty.
The numerical approaches tend to impose some restrictions on the type and
structure of the information (e.g. mutual exclusiveness of hypotheses,
conditional independence of evidence) (Bonissone, 1 987, p.860) .

Most numerical UMTs represent uncertainty as an exact quantity (scalar or interval)
on a given scale. They direct the user or expert to provide an accurate and consistent
numerical assessment of the uncertainty of both the facts and rules in the knowledge
base. The results of these systems are produced by lengthy calculations guided by
well-defined methods and appear to be equally accurate. However, given the difficulty
in obtaining such numerical values from the user, "it is clear that these models of
uncertainty require an unrealistic level of precision that does not actually represent a
real assessment of the uncertainty" (Bonissone, 1 987, p.860).

4.4.2 Comparisons of numeric UMTs
Wise and Henrion cited by Ng and Abramson( 1 986, p. 44) compared the perfonnance
of different schemes using the same set of rules and data. They report Bayesian
networks produced better results than both fuzzy sets and Certainty factors, which
were on a par. Heckermann ( 1 990, p. 283) reported that the Bayesian approach
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outperformed Dempster-S hafer and Certainly factors i n a large scale system in the
domain of lymph-node pathology. Unfortunately in neither case were the criteria for
measurement clearly stated. Hence i t remains indeterminate as to how one UMT
outperformed the others.

Bayesian

Dempster-

MYCIN's

f'uzzy Set

Probability

Shafer

Certainty
factors

Theory

Theoretical
Backe:round

Strong

S1ro11g

Weak

Moderale

Computational
Complexitv

Lmv

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Model Setup

Moderate

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Model
Execution

Low

Moderate

Low

Moderate

Complexity of
Theor:v

Low

Moderate

Low

Moderale

Ease of
Application

Easy

Difficult

Easy

Easv

Table 4.2 Comparison of Theories {Lee et al., 1987, p. 35)

Table 4.2 shows a comparison of UMTs as developed by Lee et al. Some of the entries
for Bayesian probability are surprising in the light of results reported elsewhere. The
theoretical background of Bayesian methods are undoubtedly high but the
computational complexity has been reported as exponential (NP hard). There are
however a number of different ways of using Bayesian methods.
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The ease of applit.:ation is surprising when considering a comment from Shafer
( Shafer. 1 986). that has already been noted earlier in this section. that Bayesian design
does not have the modularity of production rules. Certainty factors for example docs
have this modularity and has been claimed to be easier to use for this reason ( Dan &
Dudeck. 1992}.
Ramsbottom and Adams report on a series of ex pert systems that were developed
using an expert system shell specifically to compare three UMTs ( Bayesian logic,
Certainty factors and Fuzzy logic). They conclude that "the use of fuzzy logic
functions allow easier ex pansion of the system and more accurately represent the
nature of the uncertainty and vagueness associated with the analytical test performed"
(Ramsbottom & Adams, 1993, p.53).

4.4.2. 1 Probability Theory and its suitability for expert system
development
Probability theory is where the concept of the management of uncertainty started.
Zadeh (Zadeh, 1986) and Kosko (Kosko, 1992) have been among the most vocal
critics of its use in expert systems, others consider that probabilities can be applied
generally to any system requiring the handling of uncertainty. The major conceptual
change necessary for applying probability theory to typical fuzzy situations is to
i nterpret probabilities as a measure of belief in a relevant proposition rather than a
long run frequency (Cheeseman , 1 986).
Probability theory and its use in handling uncertainty may be mathematically sound
but there are still difficulties with the volume of data required from experts regarding
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conditional probabi li ties.
It is clear that a Bayesian design does not have the modular character of expert system
production rules. We are not free to add or remove probabil ity judgmenh from a
Bayesian design in the way that we are free to add or remove production rules from a
production system. A Bayesian design specifies very rigidly just what probability
judgment it requires. (Shafer. 1 986)
It has been suggested that we are bound to apply probability theory if uncertainty is
represented by real numbers and every relevant event may be allocated a real number
(Neopolitan. 1992). When this is not possible then other techniques must be
investigated.
Lindley cited in Neopolitan states:
It was good to realize that workers in expert systems are beginning to
understand that u ncertainty statements must be combined according to the
rules of probability. What is surprising is that they took so long to see this.
The explanation presumably is that workers in new fields seem to think that
everything is new and sometimes fail to recognize connections with older
work (Neopolitan, 1 992, p.69).

This is certainly not a universally held view. Lindley ( 1 985) asserts that decision
making under uncertainty consists of three steps:
1 . Quantify uncertainties with probability values
2. Describe the results of all actions in terms of utility.
3. Select the action that will be the most useful.
Yet this is clearly not always possible. "Circumstances do not always permit
quantification of uncertainties yet a decision may still be urgently required" (Fox et

93

al.. 1990). Lindley claims then that a decision cannot he made. However there arc
expert sys1ems that arc ahlc to produce results under such circumstances. They do not
however. use classical decision making.
Pearl (1 988) cited in Neopolitan (Neopolitan, 1992) has demonstrated that his
approach to probability ( e-semantics) "can better handle many of the problems for
which default logic and nonmonotonic logic were specifically designed".
Others have stated more explicitly the restricted applicability of the Bayesian
technique (Magill and Leech. 1 991 ). This is a summary of the problems that have
been found:
1.

Experts required to quantify uncertainty in a probabilistic manner based on

long past experience and prohibitively large samples.
2.

Two or more pieces of evidence in a rule are assumed independent.

3.

The algebraic requirement is contravened by the intuitive beliefs of experts.

Probletn 1 is based on a statement by Shortliffe and Buchanan (Shortliffe &
Buchanan, 1975) in support of their work on Certainty factors and should not be
considered current thinking. Problem 2 is also wrong when leveled at Bayesian
Techniques in general. Since the independence assumption is completely optional, it
may be made to simplify the situation but is open and acknowledged. (Early Bayesian
Techniques often made this assumption !) It is strange to consider the independence
assumption a problem of Bayesian Techniques in the light of evidence from Rothman
that Certainty factors are isomorphic to a subset of probability theory under an
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appropriate sci of assumptions ( Rolhman, 1 989). One of lhesc assumptions is
conditional independence of evidence gi ven an hypothesis. Let us consider the
possible correlation between 1wo events and the corresponding probabil ities of Lhe
conjunction anJ disjunct ion.
I.

Maximum correlation between two events is present when the less probable

event occurs only when the more probable event occurs.
The conjunction p(A&B) = M in(p(A),p( B )}
The disj unction p(A or B ) = Max(p(A), p(B ) )

2.

If two events are Independent then:
The conjunction p(A&B ) = p(A)p(B )
The disj unction p(A o r B ) = p(A) + p( B ) - p(A)p(B )

3.

If minimum correlation applies then
The conjunction p(A&B) = Max(O,p(A )+p(B) - I )
The disj unction p(A or B ) = Min( l , p(A) + p(B) )

It can b e seen from this set o f rules that the combination rules for disjunction and
conjunction that are used in Fuzzy set theory have used the assumption of maximum
correlation between the events. This may be correct or i ncorrect depending on the
example.

4.4.2.2 Certainty /actors •· the original UMT
Magill and Leech ( 199 1) investigated two commercially available expert system tools
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that used respectively. Bayes' Theorem and Certainty 1 actor-., for the handling of
uncertuinty. Their ,tim was to recommend the more appropriate tool for a certain task.
They discovered that the complex decision of which UMT was more appropriate for a
particular ES development was further hampered by the fact that "the two specific
tools do not follow strictly the theories on which they are ba-.ed". They simply quote
Shortliffe and Buchanan when looking at the applicability of MYCIN's Certainty
factors to other applications. This thesis will follow their example.
" it is potentially applicable to any problem area in which real world knowledge must
be combined with expertise before an informed opinion can be obtained to explain
observations, or to suggest a course of action". ( Shortliffe & Buchanan. 1 975. p. 353)
Some of the difficulties with Certai nty factors were considered in Chapter 3, Section
3.2.2.2 A critique of Certainty factors. Problems that have been identified by
Giarratano and Riley (Giarratano & Riley, l 994), Heckerman (Heckerman, 1 986) and
others, that could severely limit other potential application areas. were discussed.
Wise and Henrion explain that in attempting to simplify standard probabilistic
methods, UMTs such as Fuzzy sets and Certainty factors, are actually making
unacknowledged assumptions about the relationship between propositions.
Any uncertain inference methods, by implication at least, makes certain assumptions
about the unspecified parameters, particularly the correlation between propositions
(Wise and Henrion, 1986).
Bonissone (1987) suggests that there are "numerous serious problems" with the use of
CF' s. These include the interpretation of the number, the supposition of independence
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of evidence and the impossibility of interpreting a CF of zero. which doc� not allow
one to distinguish hctwecn lack of information and discordant information .

4.4.2.3 In favour of Dempster-Shafer
When compared to ad hoc techniques. Dempster-Shafer is considered hy some to be
more desirable because of its rigorous mathematical underpinning. (Cortes-Rello &
Golshani. 1 990). This is despite Shafer's comment that Dempster' -. n 1le of
combination had a pragmatic rather than mathematical basis {Shafer, 1 976).
Compared with other probability based methods such as Bayesian, the Dempster
Shafer theory is more powerful since it can work with probability of sets of points
instead of probability of just individual puints. In addition it can handle contradictory
evidence in a satisfactory manner. (Cortes-Rello & Golshani. 1 990)
Neopolitan ( 1 992) is a supporter of probabilistic techniques yet he states that there is
still a place for Dempster-Shafer. He suggests it is unfortunate that this theory has
been applied inappropriately in some expert systems because there are situations when
Dempster-Shafer can provide meaningful results and Bayesian analysis cannot.
Lingras and Wong (Lingras & Wong, 1 990, p. 468) discuss two views of belief
functions. They suggest that the compatibility view allows the use of
conditionalizations that are more usually confined to Bayesian theory. This is
contrasted with the probability allocation view that should be used when the
information available cannot be explicitly expresses in terms of propositions, but
probability allocation based on the evidence is possible. Lingras and Wong explain
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that this is because Dempster's rule for c.:ombining belief functions is defined for
independent bodies of evidence. ff there arc dependencies then they should he
identified and Bayes rule of conditionalization used.
Cortes-Rcllo and Golsh:.mi ( 1990) selected the Dempster-Shafer method for an expert
system in forecasting and marketinr management because they felt it better handled
the application. because:
I.

the solution is not a single method, bnt a set of methods.

2.

the problem is complex and the solution is based on subjective ( and possibly

contradictory) opinions of expert in forecasting techniques.
3.

we can build for different levels of abstraction (for example, rules referring to

an individual method, or rules referring to a 'class' of methods.
4.

the concept of methods having strengths and weaknesses can be modelled

using rules with confirming and 'deconfirming' beliefs over sets ot' hypotheses.
(Cortes-Rello & Golshani, 1990, p. 17)

4.4.2.4 Other Comparisons.
It is also interesting that although these techniques all claim to be different from the
next several researchers have shown that some are (just) special cases of other
techniques.
Cheeseman (Cheeseman, 1986) and Barclay in Rothman (Rothman, 1989) both liken
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Certainty factors to probability methods. Heckerman (Heckerman. 1986)
demonstrates a "clear relationship between ccrtai.1ty factors and prohabililics," that he
suggests. adds weight, to the idea that prohahility theory is sufficient for managing
uncertainty.
Grosof has shown that the revised versions of MYCIN's Certainty factors arc
equivalent to a special case of Dempster-Shafer theory. (Grosof. 1986. p. 163)
Zadeh's method of combining fuzzy sets via the max and min functions has been
criticized as "failing to describe the real world" (Jumarie. 1993 ). Jumarie suggests that
other methods that are closer to subjective probability should be used when
appropriate.

4.4.3 Comparisons of non-numeric UMTs
The research for this thesis has uncovered very few attempts to compare non-numeric
UMTs. When mentioned in comparison it has mainly been in view of the discussion
about non-numeric versus numeric techniques that was covered in Section 4.4. I.
One criticism of Cohen's theory of endorsements is due to Fox (Fox, 1986). He
suggests that although Cohen's theory of endorsements is able to successfully preserve
information about the sources of beliefs. it does not show how to deal with
knowledge that must be revised in the light of new information.
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4.5 Recent advances in the theory of reasoning
under uncertainty·
There are recent advances in the theory of reasoning under uncertainty that could be
considered for incorporation into an expert system. Probably the most important
developments are in the areas of Fuzzy Logic and Non-monotonic logics. Hybrid
systems provide an area for useful investigation.
Fuzzy logics have recently been further investigated (Novak, 1992), (Graham. 1991)
and their use is becoming accepted. Shiraishi describes Fuzzy logic as useful because
it simplifies the process of buildmg an expert system by reducing the number of rules
required (Shiraishi. 1989). Further work that ha,; been done on the efficiency of
implementation algorithms will assist with the practicalities of Fuzzy logic in expert
systems (Koczy & Hirota, 1992) and also Dempster-Shafer theory (Xu & Kennes.
1994). Fuzzy logic has also been shown to be useful in connectionist expert systems
(Cohen & Hudson, 1992).
Default logics are said to mirror more closely the reasoning process of humans than do
other forms of automated reasoning (Lea Sombe, l 990). Giordano and Martelli have
summarised the work of Reiter and others in the area of default logics (Giordano &
Martelli, 1994) and this method of reasoning is likely to become more widely used. It
is perhaps going to be most useful in the future in hybrid systems that are today still in
their infancy (Clark, 1990) (Bonissone et al. 1990).
Distributed expert systems and the problems of cooperation between expert systems is
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con:�idered by Zhang (Zhang, 1992). This interesting work also considers
trnnsformations from one UMT to another. This is done hy con'>idcring the lJMTs as
members of a mathematical structure known as a group. Isomorphic transformation-.
between the UMTs are defined. This type of definition and the transformations may
prove to be useful when designing expert systems that can implement several UMTs.
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Chapter 5: A methodology for the
selection of a paradigm of reasoning under
uncertainty in expert system
development.
5. 1 Chapter overview
This chapter presents a methodology for the selection of a paradigm of reasoning
under uncertainty in expert system development. It begins by considering the
requirements of a methodology for the selection of an UMT. Several methodologies
from the literature will be considered and shortcomings in each noted. The thesis will
then present its own methodology to assist the expert system developer in selecting an
appropriate paradigm of reasoning. The possibility of viewing the process of selection
of a paradigm as a meta-problem is then considered. The final section of the chapter
considers using this to incorporate the selection process into an expert system.

102

5.2 Some methodologies for the selection of an

UMT.
This section will consider several methodologies for the selection of an UMT
suggested in the literature and consider their appropriateness for the required task.
It has been suggested that the decision as to which is the appropriate UMT for an
expert system development is a trade-off between complexity and precision
(Bonissone & Decker. 1986). However consideration of the nature. reliability and
characteristics of the data is also important Clark agrees that the selection process is
multidimensional.
The most appropriate technique for a particular application will thus depend
upon a number of factors, such as the nature of the domain, how much
data, expertise and time is available to construct the appropriate
representation, what level of accuracy is required, what functions the
system is intended to support, the importance of meta-level capabilities and
so on. (Clark, 1990, p. 140)

The thesis now considers three methods.
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5.2.1 Saffioti's method - an outline
Saffioti suggests a method of selecting a paradigm of reasoning under uncertainty.
This approach to the prohlem is very much simply an outline or the process and docs
little to �u;sist the expert system developer with the information required to complete
each of the steps. His method indicates that the comparison should be done in three
phases ( Saffioti. 1988. p. 93)
1.

Select those techniques which are applicable to the problem (the
problem fits its preconditions)

2.

Verify the epistemological and computational adequacy of the selected
techniques for the uncertainty at hand.

3.

Weigh the remaining techniques and choose one: the general context
should be taken into account

This is a method that requires a great deal of work on the part of the expert system
developer. The first point, that very simply states ".�elect those techniques that are
applicable to the problem" is a very complex �earch of the literature in itself. unless
some form of assistance is provided to summarize the various options. The second
point requires yet more work when to the expert system developer, uncertainty is only
one (albeit important) aspect of the system development that they hnve to consider. It
is the objective of this thesis to simplify the process.
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5.2.2 Lee's method - numeric UMTs only
Lee ct al. provided a more reasonable approm:h in a table (reproduced as Tahlc 5.1)
that compares four aspects of four numeric UMTs (Lee ct al. 1987. p.36).
Bayesian
Probability

DempsterShafer

MYCIN's
Certainty
Factors

Fuzzy Set
Theory

Problem Definition

Well-defined

Well-defined

Well/Illdefined

Well/Illdefined

Computing Power
Needed

Small

Small-Large

Small

Small-utrl{e

Needed amount of
trainimz in Theorv

Little

Moderate

Little

Moderate

Needed amount of
trainine. in annlication

Little

Substantial

Little

Moderate

Table 5.1 Guidelines of Selection
Unfortunately Lee et aJ. have only considered numeric approaches to handling
uncertainty and have not justified the content of the table. There are further aspects
that required consideration including the source of uncertainty and whether large
amounts of historical imformation are available. These aspects will be included in the
methodology for selection that is proposed in section 5.3. A Manual approach to the
selection.
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5.2.3 Kline and Dolins - guidelines and quotation
The scope of this methodology is hroadcr than managing uncertainty. Kline and
Dol ins provide guidel i nes to selecting techniques for the total implementation of an
expert system. In their hook Designing Expert Systems - a guide to selecting
implt'mentation techniques. Kline and Doi ins devised a numher of gu idel ines that
cons ider a-.pects of t he problem and suggest recommended tec hniques to use in an
expert system development ( Kl ine & Dolins, 1 989). An example guidel i ne is
presemi..:d here (Figure 5. 1 ) since this is very similar to the kind of advice that this
thesis was l ooki ng to give regarding the selec tion of an UMT.

Will the expert system be solving a signal-interpretation problem ?
and
Is it hard to distinguish true signals from noise (Le, low SIN ratio)?
or
Is it easy to distinguish true sig nals from noise(i.e. high SIN ratio)?
Low S/N ratio -> Model-Driven Reasoning
Evidence: Weak, moderate
High S/N ratio -> Data-Driven Reasoning
Evidence: Moderate, powerful

Figure 5.1 An example guideline to selecting implementation techniques (Kline &

Dolins, 1989).
Quotations are then used in supporting arguments for t he design guidelines. Two
advantages are given for this type of supporting evidence:
1 . The quotations help to ensure that the design guidelines have some
degree of support among expert system builders, as opposed to merely
reflecting the personal biases of the authors of this book.
2. The quotations provide pointers to additional source of information on a
particular issue.
(Kline and Dolins, 1 989, p. 6)
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This method provides some easily accessible advice to the ex pert system developer. It
is provided in a :-mmncr that requires careful consideration hut docs not require too
much additional work beyond the deve lopment of the ex pert system itself. This thesis
will use a simihir technique. It will also use quotations to hack up the manual
approach to �election that is presented in the following section .

5.3 A manual approach to the selection
This section will present a manual approach to the selection of a paradi gm of
reasoning under uncertainty. It should be noted that whilst this thesis has attempted to
cover a broad range of UMTs the methodology for selection concentrates on numeric
methods. This is because Hybrid methods are still largely experimental and the Theory
of Endorsements (see Section 3 . 3 . 1 ) is only considered sui table in situations where the
reasoning chains are very short (Bhatnager & Kanel. 1 986).
In selecting the order for the deci sion making process consideration was given lo any
overriding features that would clearly indicate the required form of UMT. It can be
seen in Figure 5 .2 A manual approach to the selection of an UMT that the fi rst step i s
making far more clear cut dec isions that the latter steps. It i s also true that the early
steps tend to be more important. This can be likened to a process of first sorting the
goats from the sheep and then going on to sort the sheep into Merinos, Leicesters and
Suffolks.

The manual approach that follows is in the form of a number of questions that the
expert system developer should answer regarding a proposed ES development.
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Questions should be considered in the order given and can he considered to form a
decision tree. as is presented in Figure 5.2 A manual approach to the select ion of a
UMT. If the answer to any question is positive and this is confirmed by the guidel ine
then that recommendation should be fol lowed . A negat i ve answer means the
following step should be considered.
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Step la: Considers tile source ofu11certai11ty
I s uncertainty mainly in terms of incomplete data'!

la)
Guidelines la

If uncertainty is mainly in terms of incomplete data then default reasoning and
non-monotonic logic is probably appropriate.
Support/Reasons la
The process of reasoning using non-monotonic l ogics is that
• judgements are made using the available evidence by making assumptions
•

assumptions are revised in the light of new evidence.

Non-monotonic l ogic is not sui table to deal with imprecise data and so
another method will be required if this type of uncertainty is present . Refer
also to Section 3.3.2. Non-monotonic logics. ( McDennott & Doyle. 1980.
p.42), (Clark, I 990, p. 1 29)
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Step lb: Considers tire source o(uncertainty
I h)

Is uncertainty mai nly in terms of imprecision of knowledge'!

Guidelines I b
b) If uncertainty is mainly in terms of imprecision of knowledge then fuzzy
sets may be appropriate.
Support/Reasons I b
Research has shown that fuzzy set ther y is able to express concepts that are not
applicable to probabi l ity theory ( Zadeh. l 985)( Neopolitan. 1 990). This may be the
only calculus that has systematically addressed the issue of imprecision of statements
(Bhatnagar & Kanai . 1992). More efficient algorithms have been developed for the
inference process (Koczy & Hirota. 1992). When fuzzy set theory is applicable it may
reduce the number of rules required (Shiraishi , 1 989).
Step 2: Historical Data
Are large amounts of historical data avail able?
Guidelines 2
If large amounts of data are available then Bayesi an methods are likely to be
suitable (Valverde & Gehl. 1992, p. 23). There are further requirements i f
Bayesian methods are to be chosen, g o now to step 3 .
If not then go o n to step 4 .
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Support/Reasons 2

It is imporlunt to consider the structure of the problem and 1 hc case of
obtaining numerical measures. If the situation is well developed and a full
history of data is available then a system based on m athematical prohahilitics
would he appropriate ( Wisc & Hcnrion. 1 986) ( Buxton. 1 989) ( Ncopol itan.
1 992). If the structure of the problem is less well defined then a more Oexihlc

approach is required.
Step 3: Conditional Independence
ls there Conditional Independence among cases'!
Guidelines 3

Yes - then use Bayes' ru le.
No - then Subjective Bayesian may be suitable but steps 4 and 5 should also be
considered.
Support/Reasons 3

Bayes' rule assumes conditional independence ( Kline and Doi ins, 1 989) if not
then the number of conditional probabil ities required becomes prohibitive.
Subjective Bayesian Methods using networks reduce this requirement
(Heckerman & Shortliffe, 1 992) (Srinivas et al ., 1 990) (Buxton. 1 989)
(Heckerman, 1990).
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Steg 4: Representation of Ignorance
b 1hcrc an 1.• x plicit rcpn.· �cntat ion of ignoram:c rcyull'c<l'!
Guideli11es .J
Yes - then use Dempster-Shafer.
No - then go on to step 5 .
S11pport/Reaso11s 4
Dempster-Shafer provides explicit representation of ignorance through the use
of an upper and lower probability (Spil lman, 1 989 ) ( Avanzato, l 990 )(Fung &
Chong, 1 986)(Cortez-Rel lo & Golshani. 1 990)( Val verde & Gehl , 1 992 ). The
advantage is the ability to use incomplete probability models ( Shafer, 1 986.
p. 1 33 }.
Step 5: Difficulty assigning probability
Bayesian inference may be suitable but probabi li ty cannot be a,;s igned to all
pertinent events

Guidelines 5
Use Dempstei-Shafer �Neopolitan, 1 992).

Support/Reasons 5
Dempster-Shafer is suitable when a probability cannot be assigned to all e vents
(Neopolitan, 1 992) (Buxton, 1 989).
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Step 6
Is case of implcmcntatwn important'!
Guidelines 6
IF YES then Certainty Factors were devised to be straight forward
IF NO then use Subjective Bayesian methods.
Support/Reasons 6
Certainty Factors n,ay be used when a simple implementation is important
( Dan & Dudeck. 1 992) ( Heckermann & Shortli ffe, 1992). The modular
knowledge base is helpful to the developer ( Dan & Dudeck, 1992) . Certainty
Factors have been shown to work (Buchanan & Shortl i ffe, 1984 ) and expert
systems that use CFs have performed equivalent to. or better than human
experts {Heckermann & Shortliffe, I 992 )( Yu et al., 1 979).
Thus the process of selection has been described and it has resulted in a
recommendation of an UMT to be chosen for an expert system.
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STE P l a

I s unce rtainty m
terms ol
incomplete data?

Yes' ,
Use Non
Monotonic logic

STEP 1 b

ts uncertainly 1n
terms of 1mprec1s10
of knowledge1

Yes
Use Fuzzy Set

Yes

2
Are large amounts
of historical
mformat1on
available'

STE P 3

I s there conditiona
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among cases ?

Use Bayesian
Methods

.---- .

Yes

STEP 4
Exphc1I
representation ol
ignorance require

No

Use Dempster·
Shaler

..

ST E P 5
Bayesian may be
suitable but
probabilities can't b /
assigned
\
_. ,};·:c,,--,;,.· ·.•_

Yes

'· ·"l' ,,:·,,C, : '

No
STEP 6
Is ease of
Implementation
importa nt?

Use Dempster·
Shafer

?r.tt��}i

+

Use Certainty
Factors

Yes

i

No
Use Subjective
Bayesian

Figure 5.2 A manual approach to the selection of an UMT
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5.4 The process of selection as a meta-problem
This section will consider the process of selecting an UMT as a meta-problem. It
should be possible to extend the knowledge stored by the expert system to beyor.d that
of just the problem domain. The expert system will then include meta-knowledge
about the UMTs themselves. This will mean that during the development process,
features of the expert system can be identi fied that will allow an appropriate paradigm
of reasoning under uncertainty to be selected. It will then be put into place
automatically by the expert system shell.
Researches have argued for an explicit representation of the methods used for
uncertainty management.
One of the most innovatory characteristics of Al is its concern with
representing and using knowledge i n as explicit a form as possible. This
principle does not seem to have been applied to uncertainty, for which the
implicit numerical methods have usually been the only possibility. (Saffioti,
1 988, p. 86)

This suggests that assumptions about the validity of a certain UMT for a particular
application would then become apparent. If this principle were to be applied it would
mean storing meta-knowledge of the uncertainty representation and reasoning
process.
The path for selecting an UMT is thus defined as a meta-problem which is the
approach taken by Fox (Fox, 1 986). It does not however provide guidelines as to the
particular features of the UMT to consider.
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Fox ( Fox. 1 986 1 presents a ra<lical approm:h to the prohlcm of rcasunmg under
um:crtui nty. He puts forward three ar!,!urm:nt, for extending the framework of
pmhahi l ity:
•

expl icit representat ion of several t ype, of uncertainty, specificall y pm,sihility and
plausibility. as wel l as probability

•

the use of weak methods for uncertainty management in problems which are
poorly defined

•

symbolic representation of different uncertainty calculi and methods for choosing
between them

(Fox, 1986, p. 447)
So the paradigms of reasoning themselves could become pan of an extended
knowledge base of an expert system. More appropriately this would be a separate
meta-knowledge base that would be a pan of the expert systems shell. This is more
appropriate since this section of knowledge would be standard and appropriate for
any expert system development and quite separate from the domain knowledge that is
currently stored.
In the following section this idea is further considered.
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5.5 Incorporating the process of selection in an
expert system
If knowledge about UMTs can be abstracted then the process of selection of a
part icular UMT can be performed as a part of the automated process. That is -- within
the expert system itself.
It has been suggested that the expert system shell should be structured to be able to
help in the decision making process. To provide such an implementation a system
would require a set of rules that would provide for the selection of a UMT, automating
the process outlined in section 5.3 A manual approach to the selection. Also required
would be explicit representation of the control processes to implement a number of
selected calculi. The calculi provided could be selected by a trade-off between
complexity and precision and the rules used to select them rely on a number of
features including the nature of uncertainty, availablity of historical data and the
importance of easl'! of implementation -- as described in section 5.3 (Bonissone and
Decker, 1 986).
Others have supported the suggestion that the uncertainty calculi themselves should be
represented in the knowledge base. Fox ( 1 986) demonstrated that the language of
probability theory has a framework similar to other l anguages. It consists of many of
the features usually associated with context-free grammars and BNF form (Louden,
1993). This includes a "vocabulary of terminal symbols, and a set of composi tion or
transformation rules for generating sentences from elements of the vocabulary" (Fox,
1 986).
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The terminal symbols of probability theory inc . ude the real numbers.
operators (+.-. . . etc) and relations ( = , >, < etc). The composition and
transformation rules are the ordinary algebraic composition and
manipulation rules, extended operators (for example sum, product) and
specific revision rules (eg Bayes rule) (Fox. 1 986, p. 455).

The probabilistic reasoning process is represented by the production rules. When
carried out these rules will use a composed set of terminal symbols, to generate a new
set of terminals.
The advantages of including the representation of UMTs explicitly are clear. Once the
methods are included as options for an expert system development then the UMTs
become alternatives to be used as required. Thi s will not be useful until it is possible
to explicitly represent the methodology by which the selection of a UMT will be
performed. This was begun in section 5.3 A manual approach to the selection, but
remains to be validated, refined and automated. Fox suggests that once thi s i n done
UMTs will be seen "not as rivals for all the honours. but as alternatives to be used a-;
circumstances demand" (Fox, 1986, p. 455 ).
Figure 5.3 on the next page illustrates this idea with a fragment of an expert system
for advising on the selection of an uncertainty calculus under development in PROPS

2.
The first two rules generate the set of possible methods and the
assumptions which must be tested in order to evaluate them. The second
two rules generate the subset of plausible methods on the argument that
their assumptions are satisfied. The last pair of rules considers the number
of plausible candidates and recommends accordingly. If n either of these
rules is satisfied a weak uncertainty calculus can be suggested. (Fox, 1 986,
p.455)

Including meta-knowledge about the method of reasoning under uncertainty would
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provide ,mother level of flex i b i l i t y Urnt is not currently avai lahlc. Before 11 tan he done
expert system she l l s w i l l need to hccome more tlex i hlc so that the knowledge of
llMTs can he t ranslated i nto the reason ing process of the e x pert system itse l f.

if uncertainty calculus is required
and Method is a kind of uncertainty calulus
and assumptions of Method are not violated
then Method is a possible uncertainty calculus.
if m ethod is a possible uncertainty calculus
and assumptions of Method includes Assumption
then check Assumption is true
and record that assumptions of Method are checked.

if assumptions of Method includes Assumption
and Assumption is false
then assumption of Method are violated
if Method is a possible uncertainty calculus
and assumptions of Method are checked
and assumptions of Method are not violated
then plausible uncertainty methods includes Method.
if plausible uncertainty m ethods includes Method
and number of plausible uncertainty methods = 1
then method is recomm ended.
if number of p lausible uncertainty methods > 1
Then cost benefit analysis of methods is required.

Figure 5.3 Productions rules demonstrating meta-knowledge (Fox, 1986)
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6. 1 Chapter overview
This chapter will conclude the thesis. The Bibli ography is to follow.
It will be shown that the objectives of the project have been met. Consideration will
be given to the applicabil ity of the results . Suggestions will be made for the next stage
of research in this area.

6.2 Have objectives been met?
To enable consideration of whether the objectives of the project have been met they
are restated here (taken from Chapter l )
The major aim of this project is:
1 . To define the criteria on which the selection of a paradigm o f reasoning under
uncertainty for an expert system should be made.
A secondary aim is:
2. To consider what recent advances in the theory of reasoning under uncertainty are
worthy of consideration for incorporation into expert system developments.
In an attempt to answer these questions, I have gathered information from two major
sources.
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I.

The t heory of rc.1soning under uncertainty. There i, a grcal deal of material
availahlc i n journals and hook-.

A great deal of thc litcr.iturc on thi-. -.uhject relate-. to t he formal mcthoch, involved.
There arc some parts of the field ( for example Default and non-monoronic L.ogic , that
arc in the development stages and a., far a., I can ascertain arc yet to be incorporated
into expert systems.

2.

Expert System applications. Detailed information on the success or failure of the
particular UMT used is more difficult to obtain.

In chapter 5 a manual methodology for the selection of a paradigm of rea-.oning under
uncertainty was developed. This defines clearly the criteria that should be applied
during the selection process. This methodology should now undergo a process of
validation and verification that is quite likely to require the methodology to be revised.
There are recent advances in the theory of reasoning under uncertainty that could be
considered for incorporation into an expert system. The use of efficient algorithms for
Fuzzy logic and the further use of default logic were considered in Section 4.5: Recent
advances in the theory of reasoning under uncertainty.
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6.3 Consideration of the applicability of the
results
Throughout this research an attempt has heen made to cover all types of expert system
development. The main consideration ha:,; heen to diagnostic systems but necessarily
all sources of uncertainty were considered. This led to an attempt to research all major
areas of numeric. symbolic and hybrid systems. The latter two areas have proved
particularly difficult to address but perhaps also represent the main area'\ for future
research. Especially combining the symbolic methods with numeric methods.
The manual approach to the selection of an UMT that ha:-. been developed ( 5.3 A
manual approach to the selection) makes no recommendations to select an hybrid
method. It may be that if an expert system developer is not able to clearly answer the
steps of the method with a discrete answer then it may become apparent that more
than one method for handling uncertainty should ideally be used in an expert system.
The manual method also makes no attempt to select the type of non-monotonic logic
that would be most appropriate. This level of detail is beyond the scope of the thesis.

122

6.4 Recommendations and suggestions for the
next step
The manual methodology for the selection of a paradigm of reasoni ng under
uncertainty that has been developed should now undergo a proce!-.!-. of validation and
veri fication to ascertain its usefulness for the expert system developer.
It is clear that UMTs that are able to combine the ability to deal with di fferent aspect
of uncertainty in the same system need further investigation. Current expert systems
may select the method that appears most appropriate but they are not able to cope with
the full spectrum of uncertainty. Clark emphasises this
However many domains of interest are composed of a mixture of
quantitative and qualitative relations. So no UMT may be unequivocally
appropriate. This raises the need to intelligently combine diffe"9nt U MTs
and suggests that an important area of resea·rch is the use of both symbolic
and quantitative representations of uncertainty in the same application.
{Clark, 1 990, p. 1 42)

It will be important to combine methods effectively since some UMTs are able to deal
better with uncertainty arising from different sources.
Non-monotonic logics mirror more closely the reasoning used by human s and it may
be that as expert systems become able to cover a broader knowledge base these
methods of reasoning become more important. It would be worth,.,hile investigating
their use in expert systems (Bonissone et al, 1990) .
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6.5 Conclusions
In \'.'ondusion this chapter has shown that the objectives of the thc"i" have largely hccn
met. This is clear since the methodology for selection has been presented.
The next stages in the research process are in three areas. The first is to validate and
verify the methodology that has been developed in the thesis. The second is to
implement the process of selection of an UMT as a portion of an expert system shell.
The third is to further explore symbolic and especially hybrid methods of reasoning
under uncertainty. Hybrid methods are those that will be able to reason with data that
contains uncertainties of several types. Curren! examples include a numeric and
symbolic components, in the future they may contain mutiple components both
numeric and symbolic. For example Bayesian probability may deal with uncertainty
that pertains to unreliable information, Fuzzy sets for uncertainty that originates from
lack of precision and non-monotonic methods deal with incomplete information. It is
clear that there is much work still to be done in this area.
A bibliography completes the thesis.
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